-45123. I am unable to regard possible reliance on charities as a reasonable proportionality argument to be weighed in support of the impugned restriction. L.3 The Director’s discretion 124. Thirdly, the Director places heavy reliance on the existence of a discretion to waive the seven-year requirement as softening the impact of any hardship that may be caused by the restriction. Thus, Mr Cheung states: “... members of the [Welfare Panel] were informed that DSW would continue to exercise his discretion to waive the residence requirement in cases of genuine hardship, if necessary, thus making CSSA always available to the financially vulnerable in the absence of other options.”115 125. The evidence shows, however, that it is clearly not the case that CSSA is “always available to the financially vulnerable”. It is important to note the qualifying words “in the absence of other options”. In fact, the Government’s stance has been to treat the discretion as available only in exceptional cases. It has been quick to deem an applicant to have “other options”. 126. The exceptional nature of the discretion was envisaged by the Task Force from the outset: “For exceptional cases, the Director of Social Welfare, of course, will have discretionary power to grant CSSA on compassionate grounds waiving the residence rule.”116 127. And when, on 3 June 2003, the Chief Executive in Council made the Order that the seven-year requirement be implemented with effect from the following January, the fourth paragraph of the Order stated: “In exceptional circumstances, assistance may be granted at the discretion of the Director of Social Welfare (DSW) to a person who does not meet the residence requirement.” 115 Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §59. 116 Task Force Report, §5.57.