natural persons. As a result, while the legislation creating corporations is subject to the Charter, corporations themselves are not part of "government" for the purposes of s. 32 of the Charter. 36 Legislatures have created many other statutory entities, however, that are not as clearly autonomous from government. There are myriad public or quasi-public institutions that may be independent from government in some respects, but in other respects may exercise delegated governmental powers or be otherwise responsible for the implementation of government policy. When it is alleged that an action of one of these bodies, and not the legislation that regulates them, violates the Charter, it must be established that the entity, in performing that particular action, is part of "government" within the meaning of s. 32 of the Charter. 37 Perhaps the fullest discussion of the meaning of "government" in s. 32 is found in McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, and its companion cases, Harrison v. University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451, Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, and Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570. There, this Court was asked to decide whether the mandatory retirement policies adopted by certain institutions (universities, colleges and hospitals) were subject to Charter review. In confirming and elaborating upon the view taken by McIntyre J. in Dolphin Delivery, supra (viz., that the Charter applies only to Parliament, the provincial legislatures and entities that constitute part of the executive or administrative branches of government, and not to private activity), a majority of the Court in McKinney, Harrison and Stoffman found that the Charter did not apply on the facts, since the institutions whose policies were impugned were not themselves part of the apparatus of government in the sense required by s. 32(1), nor were they putting into place a government program or acting in a governmental capacity in adopting those policies. 38 In Douglas, however, the same majority found that the Charter did apply to the mandatory retirement policy at issue, on the ground that Douglas College was, in light of its constituent Act, simply an emanation of government. I described the differences between McKinney and Harrison, on the one hand, and Douglas, on the other, at pp. 584-85 of the latter case: As its constituent Act makes clear, the college is a Crown agency established by the government to implement government policy. Though the government may choose to permit the college board to exercise a measure of discretion, the simple fact is that the board is not only appointed and removable at pleasure by the government; the government may at all times by law direct its operation. Briefly stated, it is simply part of the apparatus of government both in form and in fact. In carrying out its functions, therefore, the college is performing acts of government, and I see no reason why this should not include its actions in dealing with persons it employs in performing these functions. Its status is wholly different from the universities in the companion cases of McKinney . . . and Harrison . . . which, though extensively regulated and funded by government, are essentially autonomous bodies. Accordingly, the actions of the college in the negotiation and administration of the collective agreement between the college and the association are those of the government for the purposes of s. 32 of the Charter. The Charter, therefore, applies to these activities.