52 The case of the Medical Services Commission is more straightforward. It was not contested that the Charter applies to the Commission in exercising its power to determine whether a service is a benefit pursuant to s. 4(1) of the Medical and Health Care Services Act. It is plain that in so doing, the Commission implements a government policy, namely, to ensure that all residents receive medically required services without charge. In lieu of setting out a comprehensive list of insured services in legislation, the government has delegated to the Commission the power to determine what constitutes a "medically required" service. There is no doubt, therefore, that in exercising this discretion the Commission acts in governmental capacity and is thus subject to the Charter. As there is no need to do so, I refrain from commenting on whether the Commission might be considered part of government for other purposes. Section 15(1) of the Charter 53 Having concluded that the Charter applies to the failure of hospitals and the Medical Services Commission to provide sign language interpreters, it remains to be determined whether that failure infringes the appellants' equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter. That provision states: 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. I emphasize at the outset that s. 15(1), like other Charter rights, is to be generously and purposively interpreted; see Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 156, R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at pp. 336 and 344, Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 509, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at p. 175, United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, at p. 1480, and Reference Re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at p. 179. As Lord Wilberforce proclaimed in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319 (P.C., Bermuda), at p. 328, a constitution incorporating a bill of rights calls for "a generous interpretation avoiding what has been called `the austerity of tabulated legalism,' suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to"; see also Hunter, at p. 156. 54 In the case of s. 15(1), this Court has stressed that it serves two distinct but related purposes. First, it expresses a commitment -- deeply ingrained in our social, political and legal culture -- to the equal worth and human dignity of all persons. As McIntyre J. remarked in Andrews, at p. 171, s. 15(1) "entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration". Secondly, it instantiates a desire to rectify and prevent discrimination against particular groups "suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our society"; see R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at p. 1333 (per Wilson J.); see also Beverley McLachlin, "The Evolution of Equality" (1996), 54 Advocate 559, at p. 564. While this Court has confirmed that it is not necessary to show membership in a historically disadvantaged group in order to establish a s. 15(1) violation, the fact that a law draws a distinction on such a ground is an important indicium of