deference should not be accorded to the legislature merely because an issue is a "social" one or because a need for governmental "incrementalism" is shown; see Egan, at para. 97 (per L'Heureux-Dubé J.) and at paras. 215-16 (per Iacobucci J.). In the present case, the failure to provide sign language interpreters would fail the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test under a deferential approach. It is, therefore, unnecessary to decide whether in this "social benefits" context, where the choice is between the needs of the general population and those of a disadvantaged group, a deferential approach should be adopted. 86 At the same time, the leeway to be granted to the state is not infinite. Governments must demonstrate that their actions infringe the rights in question no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve their goals. Thus, I stated the following for the Court in Tétreault-Gadoury, supra, at p. 44: It should go without saying, however, that the deference that will be accorded to the government when legislating in these matters does not give them an unrestricted licence to disregard an individual's Charter rights. Where the government cannot show that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that it has complied with the requirement of minimal impairment in seeking to attain its objectives, the legislation will be struck down. 87 In the present case, the government has manifestly failed to demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that a total denial of medical interpretation services for the deaf constituted a minimum impairment of their rights. As previously noted, the estimated cost of providing sign language interpretation for the whole of British Columbia was only $150,000, or approximately 0.0025 percent of the provincial health care budget at the time. This figure was based on an extrapolation from the services then being provided by the Western Institute for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing in the Lower Mainland area. Although there was little evidence presented of the precise content of this service, it was not suggested that its extension throughout the province would not have fulfilled the requirements of s. 15(1). In these circumstances, the refusal to expend such a relatively insignificant sum to continue and extend the service cannot possibly constitute a minimum impairment of the appellants' constitutional rights. 88 The respondents argue, however, that the situation of deaf persons cannot be meaningfully distinguished from that of other non-official language speakers. If they are compelled to provide interpreters for the former, they submit, they will also have to do so for the latter, thereby increasing the expense of the program dramatically and placing severe strain on the fiscal sustainability of the health care system. In this context, they contend, it was reasonable for the government to conclude that they impaired the rights of deaf persons as little as possible. 89 This argument, in my view, is purely speculative. It is by no means clear that deaf persons and non-official language speakers are in a similar position, either in terms of their constitutional status or their practical access to adequate health care. From the perspective of a patient, there is no real difference between sign language and oral language if there is no ability to communicate with a physician. But from the perspective of the state's obligations, there may very well be. In the present case, the only relevant constitutional provisions are ss. 15(1) and 1 of the Charter. In a case involving a claim for medical interpretation for hearing patients, in contrast, the