93 Viewed in this light, it is impossible to characterize the government's decision not to fund sign language interpretation as one which "reasonably balances the competing social demands which our society must address"; see McKinney, supra, p. 314. It should be recalled that the Ministry of Health decided not to fund the interpretation program even in part. Other options, such as the partial or interim funding of the program offered by the Western Institute for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, or the institution of a scheme requiring users to pay either a portion of the cost of interpreters or the full amount if they could afford to do so, were either not considered or were considered and rejected. In this sense, the present case is similar to Tétreault-Gadoury, supra, where the Court found that the denial of unemployment insurance benefits to persons over 65 violated s. 15(1) and could not be saved under s. 1 of the Charter. Writing for the Court, I found that one of the reasons that this denial failed the minimal impairment test was that persons over 65 were not entitled to any benefits. "Even allowing the government a healthy measure of flexibility in legislating in this area", I stated, at p. 47, "the complete denial of unemployment benefits is not an acceptable method of achieving any of the government objectives set forth above. . . ." That being said, I do not wish to be understood as intimating that the alternative measures I have adverted to would survive s. 1 scrutiny. I refer to them solely for the purpose of demonstrating that the government did not attempt to institute a scheme that would constitute a lesser limitation on deaf persons' rights. 94 In summary, I am of the view that the failure to fund sign language interpretation is not a "minimal impairment" of the s. 15(1) rights of deaf persons to equal benefit of the law without discrimination on the basis of their physical disability. The evidence clearly demonstrates that, as a class, deaf persons receive medical services that are inferior to those received by the hearing population. Given the central place of good health in the quality of life of all persons in our society, the provision of substandard medical services to the deaf necessarily diminishes the overall quality of their lives. The government has simply not demonstrated that this unpropitious state of affairs must be tolerated in order to achieve the objective of limiting health care expenditures. Stated differently, the government has not made a "reasonable accommodation" of the appellants' disability. In the language of this Courts' human rights jurisprudence, it has not accommodated the appellants' needs to the point of "undue hardship"; see Simpsons-Sears, supra, and Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra. Remedy 95 I have found that where sign language interpreters are necessary for effective communication in the delivery of medical services, the failure to provide them constitutes a denial of s. 15(1) of the Charter and is not a reasonable limit under s. 1. Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that anyone whose rights under the Charter have been infringed or denied may obtain "such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances". In the present case, the appropriate and just remedy is to grant a declaration that this failure is unconstitutional and to direct the government of British Columbia to administer the Medical and Health Care Services Act (now the Medicare Protection Act) and the Hospital Insurance Act in a manner consistent with the requirements of s. 15(1) as I have described them.