operation, and it is not unimaginable that we might say that one or both of these are also constrained by something like socioeconomic rights. 68 Would persons in the original position insist on such constraints? The answer is "possibly, yes"-in fact, the claim that they would insist on some such constraint might be more plausible than the claim that they would adopt the Difference Principle as that is ordinarily understood. Let me explain. Rawls's own view is that any individual behind the veil of ignorance choosing principles to govern the basic structure of society in which the individual was to live would insist on a principle that ensured social and economic inequalities were regulated to the advantage, in the first instance, of the least well-off group.69 This is the Rawlsian Difference Principle. (As we have seen, that principle is not itself supposed to determine what anyone is entitled to, but it would not be surprising if it commanded the institution of something like a modem system of tax and transfer.) Many critics, however, find it incredible that people in the original position would be so solicitous of the worstoff group in all circumstances. 70 They concede that such solicitude might be intelligible on the assumption that members of the worst-off group are suffering serious deprivation. But if everyone is enjoying great luxury, it seems odd to commit oneself to a principle that we must always pay attention to plight of members of the group enjoying the least luxury, sacrificing if necessary the possibility of more luxury overall. This suggests that the reasons for parties in the original position to choose something like the Difference Principle evaporate as the actual level of well-being of the worst-off group improves. Of course, the parties behind the veil of ignorance are assumed not to know what the level of general prosperity is, but they might adopt a conditional principle. They might say, "If the worst-off group is below a certain (specified) absolute level of deprivation, then all social and economic inequalities should be oriented to their advantage; if they are above that level of deprivation, then that exclusive concern may not be appropriate." In other words, individuals choosing from behind the veil of ignorance might explicitly adopt some principle of social minimum. They might reason, for example, that they should make all efforts to avoid radical deprivation of a sort that might undermine the most important aspects of human functioning: the nutrition necessary for ordinary action and reproduction, the shelter and clothing necessary for 68. Id. at 53-55. 69. Id. at 130-60. 70. Id at 68; see also ADAM SWIFT, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 26-27 (2d ed. 2006). 71. A principle oriented to the social minimum would be different from the social minimum policy discussed by Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 244-45, 251-52; see also JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS 127-29 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 796