includes economic and social rights with so-called “internal” limitations clauses, and those without (for example, that no one may be evicted without an order from court; and that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment),77 has declined to integrate proportionality analysis in the adjudication of economic and social rights in all but two cases. Why is this so? The South African Constitutional Court has employed proportionality analysis for other constitutional rights.78 Indeed, it has relied on proportionality analysis to resolve some of the most dramatic rights controversies, starting with the early decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty.79 A structured limitations clause, borrowed from Germany via Canada, provides that any prima facie violations of rights proceed through a multi-factored proportionality analysis. 80 The Constitutional Court, however, is not a strict adherent of the multipronged structure of the test: the Court considers the clause requires it to engage in “a balancing exercise and arrive at a global judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a sequential check-list”.81 Thus, while: As a general rule, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be … the question is one of Jackman & Bruce Porter, Socio-Economic Rights under the Canadian Charter, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 209 (Malcolm Langford, ed., 2008). 77 Sth. Afr. Const., §§ 26(3), 27(3). 78 First National Bank v. Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 79 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (under interim Constitution). 80 Sth. Afr. Const., § 36; cf. Interim Sth. Afr. Const. § 33 (retaining an essence formulation). 81 S v. Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 at para. 32; S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 104. Applying to final Constitution: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 33–35. 16