analysis to advance human rights, using the analysis of health‐related expenditures in the Mexican
national budget as a case study (Fundar 2004). A few years later, a team at Queens University Belfast
completed a "Budget Analysis Project", providing a human rights framework for the analysis of public
budgets insofar as they relate to the realization of economic and social rights, and applying that
framework to the budgetary allocations and expenditure in Northern Ireland (Budget Analysis Project
2010).
Budget analysis serves two distinct purposes. One is to promote transparency in the use of public
revenue: by comparing sources of government revenue with expenditures, instances of "leakage"
can be identified, and corruption, nepotism or clientelism by government officials can be highlighted
by examining who benefits from public programs. Such a scrutiny can take many forms, including
social audits at community level, that can be empowering even to the poor and illiterate (Peisakhin
and Pinto 2010; UNESCO 2007; for a more sceptical assessment, Cleaver 1999). By thus enhancing
accountability, budget analysis is a major asset in ensuring that public policies are more pro‐poor,
and that they will therefore indirectly benefit the realization of economic and social rights.
But another function of budget analysis is to monitor fulfilment of economic and social rights
directly: that is to say, to ensure that the expenditures are in compliance with the duty of the
government to dedicate the maximum of available resources to the progressive realization of these
rights, as required by Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The hope is that using a human rights framework will provide some benchmark, allowing
activists representing the poor to hold the government to account for its choice of priorities :
By digging into the details of the budget, by making the raw numbers tell a story about
government priorities, budget analysis helps lay bare the choices confronting a government
and its people. But while budget work can assist in identifying what government officials are
doing or have done over time and what�� the true priorities of the government are, budget
analysis cannot by itself identify what the true priorities ought to be. A human rights
framework can help fill this gap. (Fundar 2004: 30)
Economic and social rights, as stipulated in the Covenant, are expected to provide advocates with
enough guidance, allowing them to link their analysis of public budgets to the human rights
obligations of the State. But can they? Identifying choices made in public budgets that shall lead to a
retrogression in the enjoyment of certain rights ‐‐ choices that are considered highly suspect and
require a special justification from the government ‐‐, or that may result in discrimination against
certain particularly disadvantaged groups, is relatively straightforward. Beyond that however, the
relationship between the percentage of a country's GDP (or, even less plausibly, the percentage of
the public budget) going to the fulfilment of economic and social rights and that country's legal
obligations to fulfil such rights, is bound to remain contested. As reported by Aiofe Nolan and Mira
Dutschke in Chapter 13 of this volume, a country may stipulate in its constitution that a particular
part of its budget shall go to improving education, as Ecuador, Brazil and the Philippines have done;
but that of course does not indicate the existence of a legal obligation under international law to
make a particular budgetary effort. And it is significant that most judicial decisions that conclude that
an economic or social right has been violation as a result of budgetary choices in fact impose a
prohibition on reducing existing levels of enjoyment of the said right: this not only illustrates the
difficulty of defining, positively, what the required level of expenditures should be; as Landau
remarked, it also raises the fear that the courts using this tool may be in fact protect those that
already are recognized entitlements, rather than the poorest whose situation would only improve
following more ambitious social reforms. The exceptions to this pattern are cases where welfare
benefits were set at a level so low that they could not be defended as meeting even the "essential
content" of the right to an adequate standard of living, or cases where the budget entailed a
discrimination against certain groups. Though it can be asserted in theory, as Nolan and Dutschke do,
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CRIDHO‐WP‐2013/2: O. De Schutter – Economic,Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights: An Introduction