As we have previously emphasized, the sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools lies with the General Assembly. If they choose to delegate any of this duty to institutions such as the local boards of education, the General Assembly must provide a mechanism to assure that the ultimate control remains with the General Assembly, and assure that those local school districts also exercise the delegated duties in an efficient manner. The General Assembly must provide adequate funding for the system. How they do this is their decision. However, if ad valorem taxes on real and personal property are used by the General Assembly as part of the financing of the redesigned state system of common schools, the General Assembly has the obligation to see that all such property is assessed at 100% of its fair market value. Russman v. Luckett, Ky., 391 S.W.2d 694 (1965). Moreover, because of the great disparity of local tax efforts in the present system of common schools, the General Assembly must establish a uniform tax rate for such property. In this way, all owners of real and personal property throughout the state will make a comparable effort in the financing of the state system of common schools. This decision has not been reached without much thought and consideration. We do not take our responsibilities lightly, and we have decided this case based on our perception and interpretation of the Kentucky Constitution. We intend no criticism of any person, persons or institutions. We view this decision as an opportunity for the General Assembly to launch the Commonwealth into a new era of educational opportunity which will ensure a strong economic, cultural and political future. Because of the enormity of the task before the General Assembly to recreate a new statutory system of common schools in the Commonwealth, and because we realize that the educational process must continue, we withhold the finality of this decision until 90 days after the adjournment of the General Assembly, sine die, at its regular session in 1990. COMBS, GANT, LAMBERT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. GANT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., file separate concurring opinions. LEIBSON and VANCE, JJ., file separate dissenting opinions. GANT, Justice, concurring. I concur in that portion of the majority's decision which holds that the Kentucky General Assembly has failed to comply with Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution and has not provided for "an efficient system of common schools throughout the State." [FN1] The majority accurately acknowledges that this Court has a constitutional duty to make such a holding. However, the Court's constitutional duty is not fulfilled merely by declaring that the common school system in Kentucky is constitutionally deficient. This Court must take the additional step of directing the Trial Court to issue appropriate writs to compel correction of this constitutional deficiency. [FN1. I also join in the majority's ruling on the procedural issues concerning the parties to this action.] The Governor, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and members of the State Board of Education and General Assembly, all of whom are parties to this litigation, swore to "support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this