A/HRC/22/42 reparations.63 This is particularly the case if returned illicit funds derive from assets controlled by politically exposed persons that are alleged to have directly or indirectly been responsible for past human rights violations, including violations of economic, social and cultural rights. 54. According to a study commissioned by the European Parliament, there is a comprehensive European Union regulatory framework to identify, trace, seize and confiscate proceeds of organized crime in the European Union. However, implementation of this regulatory framework is proceeding slowly. Moreover, there is no regulation pertaining to the social re-use of confiscated assets and most European Union member States do not have provision for the use of confiscated assets for civil society or for social purposes.64 55. Human rights are also relevant for the seizure and freezing of the proceeds of corruption or other criminal activities. It is notable in this regard that some provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption have been contested on human rights grounds. Article 31, paragraph 8, of the Convention provides that an offender must demonstrate the lawful origin of not only the alleged proceeds of crime but also of other property liable to confiscation. Nevertheless, the OHCHR study notes that “similar provisions were analysed in a set of precedents that established the conditions that must be met in order not to violate due-process rights. Such precedents held that the right to be presumed innocent is not an absolute right, and that legal presumptions in criminal law are not per se restrictive to such right as long as States take into account the importance of what is at stake, and respect the right to defense” (A/HRC/19/42, para. 46). 56. Finally, illicit financial flows should not be a human rights concern for States only. While States have the primary duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights require business enterprises to “avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur” (guiding principle 13). Business enterprises that contribute through transfer mispricing, tax evasion or corruption to significant illicit financial outflows and undermine the abilities of States to progressively achieve the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights cause adverse human rights impacts. This is particularly the case when they operate in States that have difficulties in meeting the minimum core human rights obligations. The same applies to trust and company service providers and commercial banks that do not meet basic due diligence standards when they provide services or help launder and hide illicit funds in offshore financial centres. V. Next steps 57. Over the next few months, the Independent Expert will continue gathering information for the study requested by the Council. Given the complexity of the subject matter and the paucity of empirical data concerning the human rights and development dimensions of the illicit financial flows, he considers that he will only be in a position to prepare a comprehensive study after extensive consultations with all stakeholders, including 63 64 For an argument that transitional justice should engage more strongly with corruption and economic crimes, see, inter alia, Ruben Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?” The International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 2, No. 3 (2008), pp. 310–330. See European Parliament, The need for new EU legislation allowing the assets confiscated from criminal organisations to be used for civil society and in particular for social purposes (Brussels, 2012). 19