A/HRC/22/42 representing between 15 per cent and 30 per cent of all official development aid (ODA) currently received by developing countries.16 14. The Independent Expert is concerned that, of the considerable amount of illicit funds referred to above, only a small proportion has been repatriated to the countries of origin. According to the StAR Initiative, only US$5 billion in stolen assets have been repatriated over the past 15 years.17 A recent survey of 30 OECD member countries showed that only six of these had frozen assets worth slightly over US$1.2 billion during the years 2006 to 2009, and they had managed to return only assets worth US$227 million to foreign jurisdictions during these four years. 18 15. Other studies also demonstrate low rates of repatriation of illicit funds or stolen assets to countries of origin. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has estimated that only around 2 per cent of the estimated funds of illicit origin annually leaving the developing world are repatriated to their countries of origin.19 While the Arab Spring has renewed efforts to freeze a significant amount of stolen assets by politically exposed persons (such as heads of State and senior public officials) from this region, it is likely that only a fraction of all illicit funds can be traced and finally returned to their countries of origin after the required investigations. Similarly, a study analysing the fate of assets stolen, embezzled or otherwise unlawfully obtained by 25 prominent political leaders after they were forced from office shows that the overall sum of stolen assets by these rulers and their family members was approximately US$140 billion. However, only a small fraction (5 per cent) of these assets have ever been traced and frozen abroad, and even a smaller fraction (2.4 per cent) had been returned to new, legitimate successor Governments.20 16. The low level of repatriation of illicit funds is attributable to several factors, including the length and complexity of the asset recovery process. 21 It can also be argued that the lack of political will on the part of the authorities of the countries of origin and countries where illicit funds are held is another obstacle.22 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 8 In 2011, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee reported US$135.5 billion net official development assistance. See OECD, Development Co-operation Report 2012: Lessons in linking sustainability and development (Paris, 2012). Kevin M. Stephenson and others, Barriers to Asset Recovery: An Analysis of the Key Barriers and Recommendations for Action (Washington, D.C., StAR Initiative, 2011), p. 11. OECD/World Bank, Tracking Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Commitments: A Progress Report and Recommendations for Action (Paris and Washington, D.C., 2011), p. 5. These figures do not consider the funds frozen and/or returned to Egypt, Tunisia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya in 2011, a process that has renewed asset-recovery efforts. A/HRC/19/42 and Corr.1, para. 8. MyPrivateBanking, “Billions without a Trace – Dictators‟ Stolen Assets,” May 2011. For an overview of the many legal and practical obstacles that both countries of origin and destination face when trying to recover or repatriate illicit funds, see, e.g, Stephenson, Barriers to Asset Recovery (2011) and A/HRC/19/42. See, e.g., Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Illicit assets of politically exposed persons (PEPs)”. Available from www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/finec/poexp.html