performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. (Brown v Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 [1954].) In the years since the Brown decision was handed down, State and local governments have struggled with fulfilling the "most important function" of providing universal free primary and secondary education. This case raises an issue that has proved particularly vexing to educators, policymakers, and the general public: how to devise a method of funding public schools that assures students at least a minimally adequate education. Plaintiffs, comprised of students, parents and organizations concerned with education issues, challenge New York State's funding of New York City's public schools. After pretrial motion practice, appeals, and discovery, two claims were tried before this court from October 12, 1999 to May 15, 2000. Extensive posttrial briefing followed. In the first of these two claims, plaintiffs assert that the State has failed to assure that New York City's public schools receive adequate funding to afford their students the "sound basic education" guaranteed by the Education Article of the New York Constitution (NY Const, art XI, § 1; Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27 [1982]). In their second claim, plaintiffs assert that the State's funding mechanisms have an adverse and disparate impact upon the City's minority public school students—who comprise 73% of the State's minority students and approximately 84% of the City's public school enrollment—in violation of specific implementing regulations of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000d; 34 CFR 100.3 [b] [1], [2]). The defendants who remained in the case by the time of trial, New York State, Governor George Pataki, and State Tax Commissioner Michael Urbach, vigorously dispute these claims. They argue that New York State spends more per student on education than all but three other States, that New York City spends more per student than any other large school district in the Nation, and that this provision of funds is more than is necessary to provide a sound basic education to New York City's public school students. In the alternative, defendants argue that any failure to provide a constitutionally adequate education is the fault of New York City, for failing to [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 4] 4] contribute its fair share of school funding, and of the City's Board of Education, for failing to adequately manage the funding it receives from Federal, State, and City sources. Defendants also assert that State education aid is allocated on a nondiscriminatory basis. The court holds that the education provided New York City students is so deficient that it falls below the constitutional floor set by the Education Article of the New York Constitution. The court also finds that the State's actions are a substantial cause of this constitutional violation. With respect to plaintiffs' claim under title VI's implementing regulations, the court finds that the State school funding system has an adverse and disparate impact on minority public school children and that this disparate impact is not adequately justified by any reason related to education. Accordingly, plaintiffs have proven their Federal law claim as well. The findings of fact that form the foundation for these legal conclusions are set forth in sections III through VI below. However, before embarking on an examination of the massive factual record presented by the parties, it will be necessary first to provide a brief procedural history of the case, and a brief description of the arc of school funding litigation nationwide that began in California with Serrano v Priest (5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 [1971]). This background will help place into context both the parties' arguments and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements concerning the content of the "sound basic education" standard. I . T h e P r o c e d u ra l H i s t o r y o f T h i s C a s e Plaintiffs filed this action in May 1993 against the current defendants, an array of other elected officials, and the Commissioner of the State Education Department (SED). 1 At the same time the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education brought an action against the State and other defendants alleging virtually identical claims. Both actions came before this court. [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 5] 5] Defendants moved to dismiss both complaints. This court partially granted defendants' motions as discussed in the following paragraphs. This court dismissed the City's action on the ground that as a subdivision of the State subject to the State's direction and control the City could not challenge the constitutionality of the acts of its governmental parent. 2 Several New York community school boards, governmental units which are part of the City's Board of Education, were dismissed as plaintiffs from the instant lawsuit on the same grounds (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 162 Misc.2d 493, 496-497 [1994]). This court also dismissed plaintiffs' Federal and State equal protection claims as barred by decisions of the Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals, respectively. In San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1 [1973]) the Supreme Court held that Texas' system of financing its school system largely through property taxes, which resulted in large school funding disparities between rich and poor areas of the State, did not violate the "rational basis" test of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist (57 N.Y.2d 27 [1982], supra) the Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion with respect to the New York Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. The Levittown Court thus rejected an attack on New York State's school funding based on an equality principle, a principle that posits that all school districts must be funded equally. However, it left open the door to an argument based on an adequacy principle, an argument based on the premise that the State must ensure an education to public school students that satisfies some basic minimum requirements (see Levittown, supra, 57 NY2d, at 38). Following the distinction between claims based on equality and adequacy set forth in Levittown (supra), this court let stand plaintiffs' claim that the State's funding mechanisms cause New York City public school students to receive something less than the sound basic education required by the Education Article of the New York Constitution. This court dismissed plaintiffs' claims based on title VI, which bars discrimination by schools that receive Federal funding. The complaint included no