remove such impediments. As the Court of Appeals explained in sustaining the complaint in this case, "We recognized in Levittown that the Education Article imposes a duty upon the Legislature to ensure the availability of a sound basic education to all the children of the State." (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 315, supra [emphasis added].) The State's power over education is plenary. The State prescribes the architecture of governance in the State's school districts. For example, in 1969 the State decentralized the New York City school district, devolving significant power to the City's community school boards (see L 1969, ch 330). In 1996, after decentralization—at least as practiced in the City—had long proven to be a failure, the Legislature radically reduced the power of community school boards and concomitantly increased the power of the Chancellor and the central board (see Education Law §§ 2590-d-2590-j). Other examples of the State's plenary powers over educational governance can be seen by such diverse actions as the creation of the New York City School Construction Authority in 1988 (see L 1988, ch 738, § 1) and the imposition of a "Maintenance of Effort Law" requiring the City to maintain education funding at a specified portion of the City's budget (see L 1976, ch 132; Matter of Board of Educ. v City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 535, 542-543 [1977]). The State prescribes the means by which municipalities and school districts raise revenue for education. Pursuant to State law, all but five of the State's approximately 682 school districts are "independent" districts which raise local revenue for education through taxes levied by their boards of education on residential and commercial properties within the boundaries of each district. For the independent school districts, such property taxes provide nearly 90% of local (i.e., not State or Federal) education funding. By contrast the Legislature dictates that the school districts of the State's five largest cities (New York, Yonkers, Buffalo, Syracuse, and Rochester) shall have no independent [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 81] 81] revenue-generating authority. Because they are not allowed to levy taxes to fund their school budgets, these "Big 5" school districts are known as "dependant school districts." The dependant school districts must depend on the local municipal government and City-wide taxes for the local component of their school budgets. The State Constitution gives the State broad authority to create and modify local governments and their functions, including their tax structures and limitations on their tax rates and debt capacity. (NY Const, art III, § 1; art XVI, § 1.) Local governments, such as New York City, may incur debt and levy, collect and administer local taxes only where consistent with the laws of the Legislature. The Court of Appeals has ruled that: Under our form of State government, the exclusive power of taxation is lodged in the State Legislature * * * A corollary to this basic rule is that municipalities such as the City of New York have no inherent taxing power, but only that which is delegated by the State * * * Moreover, the delegation of State taxing power to a municipality must be made in express terms by enabling legislation. (Castle Oil Corp. v City of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 334, 338-339 [1996].) The State regularly dictates or approves changes in the City's tax structure. For example, the City has enacted at least 14 different tax cuts in the last several years, as part of its tax reduction plan. New York State has authorized or approved a majority of these cuts. The State has also acted unilaterally to repeal or restrict New York City taxes. The State's causation arguments run athwart the argument it successfully made in seeking the dismissal of the companion case of City of New York v State of New York (86 N.Y.2d 286, supra). There the State argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the City lacked capacity to bring a suit against the State asserting virtually the same claims as those asserted by the plaintiffs herein. Constitutionally as well as a matter of historical fact, municipal corporate bodies—counties, towns and school districts—are merely subdivisions of the State, created by the State for the convenient carrying out of the State's governmental powers and responsibilities as its agents. Viewed, therefore, by the courts as purely creatures or agents of the State, it followed that municipal corporate bodies cannot have the right to contest the actions of their principal or creator affecting them in their governmental capacity or as representatives of their inhabitants. (City of New York v State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 289-290.) As "creatures or agents of the State" both BOE and the City are subject to the State's control. Whatever authority they exercise over education is authority delegated by the State. The State Constitution explicitly provides that the State's control over educational matters is not subject to the home rule powers granted local governments (see NY Const, art IX, § 3 [a] [1]). Defendants point out that the State's public schools have traditionally been funded from State and local sources. From this inarguable fact, they proceed to assert that the State has "surrendered" a portion of its sovereign powers to school districts (and, in the case of the "Big 5," to municipal governments), as if this "surrender" were irrevocable. To the contrary, the cases cited by defendants for this proposition make it clear that the State's delegation of powers is revocable (see Matter of Board of Educ. v City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d 98, 100 [1969]; Hirshfield v Cook, 227 N.Y. 297, 301, 309-310 [1919]). This holding, that the State is ultimately responsible for assuring the provision of a sound basic education, does not carry with it a correlative finding that BOE's management of the New York City school district is entirely adequate, or that the City's contribution to its own schools is sufficient. In fact evidence introduced at trial, summarized in subsection (F) below, suggests that both BOE and the City have contributed to the schools' current crisis. However, even if this court were to hold that the failures of the City and BOE were not the ultimate responsibility of the State, the State's own funding mechanism for distributing aid to schools would remain a substantial cause of the public schools' malaise. The State's system for allocating aid to public schools is discussed in the next section. D . T h e S t at e A i d D i s t r i b u t i o n S y s t e m The State's school aid distribution system has for over a decade prevented the New York City public school system from receiving sufficient funds to provide its students with a sound basic education. As SED, the Regents, and numerous State-appointed blue ribbon commissions have repeatedly reported to [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 83] 83] the State Legislature, the State aid distribution system does not provide adequate funding to all districts. As recently stated by SED: "resources are not aligned with need. Those schools with the greatest need frequently have the fewest fiscal resources * * * The situation in New York City illustrates this point."