Even if the State Constitution did not place upon the State this ultimate responsibility for the provision of a sound basic education, the State's distribution system for its own funding, in isolation, remains a cause of this constitutional violation. The law recognizes that there may be many "causal links" to a single outcome, and there is no reason to think that the Court of Appeals 1995 opinion mandates a search for a single cause of the failure of New York City schools. For this reason, even if the State were not ultimately responsible for the actions of BOE or the City, its own actions expose it to liability. 1. Defendants' Assertions Regarding BOE Defendants alleged at trial that BOE wastes vast sums of money through fraud, corruption and waste. The evidence demonstrates that decentralization of the governance of the New York City school district led to inefficiency, mediocrity and corruption in some of the City's community school districts. Pursuant to the broad decentralization law passed by the Legislature in 1969, community school boards were given control of elementary and middle schools in their respective districts. This power included the power to hire an array of school personnel, from district superintendents to principals to school aides. The central board retained control of City high schools, special education and a variety of City-wide programs. In many of the City's school districts, community school board members were more concerned with their own political advancement (and in some cases, with their enrichment) than they were with education. Board members used their hiring power to find jobs for supporters and relatives. Some board members received kickbacks in return for the provision of jobs. Theft of school supplies was common in certain corrupt school districts. Some of the worst community school boards had jurisdiction over schools in the City's poorest neighborhoods. The evidence did not show that large sums were lost to corruption and fraud. The most important results of corrupt or inept community school boards were demoralization of school staff and inattention to educational issues. The evidence indicates that student performance in some districts inevitably [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 93] 93] suffered as a result of poor governance by community school boards. There was no probative evidence measuring the magnitude of this negative effect, however. Moreover, the failings of community school boards cannot be blamed on BOE. The decentralization law gave BOE limited powers to oversee the boards. To the extent that defendants allege that corruption and waste by community school boards had a negative effect on student outcomes, the blame must lie with the State for perpetuating a form of school governance that generated corruption and waste. Though problems with decentralization became clear by the early 1980's, the State did not diminish the powers of community school boards until 1996. This legislation, however belated, appears to have reduced malfeasance in the City's public schools. In addition, BOE is subject to extensive financial reporting rules and regulations. It is also served by an active Special Commissioner for Investigation who is charged with investigating corruption, fraud, conflicts of interest and other forms of unethical conduct. Both of these are checks on widespread illegality. Defendants presented some probative evidence that BOE does not make the most effective use of all the money provided to it. However, BOE's record of waste is not so grim as defendants allege. As discussed in section IV (G) above, defendants provided some evidence that BOE's personnel could be more effectively managed. However, the issues of productivity gains and incentive pay are two of many that must be considered in contract negotiations with the relevant unions. Any cost savings realized by productivity gains would likely be offset by the costs of improving working conditions and increasing teacher salaries in order to attract and retain better teachers. Defendants are correct that BOE's methods for evaluating teachers and improving their performance are currently ineffective. However, as discussed above, these failings are to some degree a function of inadequate funding. Because of a dearth of qualified teachers willing to work in the City's public schools, supervisors are often unwilling to take steps to replace ineffective teachers. Additionally, professional development that could help underperforming teachers is currently underfunded in the City's public schools. Defendants presented little evidence concerning BOE's allegedly wasteful spending on administration. Plaintiffs point out that BOE spends a smaller percentage of its budget on its central administration than the State-wide average. The most [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 94] 94] recent estimates introduced at trial indicate that New York City spends 1.8% of its budget on central administration, compared with 1.9% State-wide (an average that includes New York City). Additionally, BOE spends 77.8% of its funds on instruction, a greater proportion than the 76.1% State-wide average. These figures do not reveal that the funds they encompass were spent effectively, but the comparison does cast some doubt on BOE's reputation as a top-heavy bureaucracy. Defendants did not provide convincing evidence that BOE is responsible for failure to conduct preventive maintenance on the City's public school buildings. Rather, the evidence shows that BOE lacks sufficient funds to conduct all necessary preventive maintenance, and must devote the lion's share of its limited resources to fixing major structural problems at the schools. Defendants' claims that BOE is profligate in its new construction spending are also not supported by the record. The credible evidence demonstrates that construction of new schools will have to be part of any plan to deal with overcrowding. As discussed in section IV above, the defendants' proposals to simply increase the utilization of existing school buildings would overtax these buildings and impede students' access to the educational resources they need for a sound basic education. Additionally, defendants' claim that the schools built by BOE are educational "Taj Mahals" is not supported by the record. The evidence indicates that, with a few exceptions, BOE and the School Construction Authority are building functional schools without unnecessary amenities. The record does establish that some inefficiencies have been created by the State-imposed division of authority between BOE and the School Construction Authority. However, the Authority was created by the State. To the extent that it has hampered school construction in New York City, the responsibility must lie with the State. The most serious evidence of BOE's inefficient spending concerns special education. However, fixing the problems of special education will cost money which will largely offset any cost savings realized by reform.