Aid Data Form" in which they indicate the changes to the formula or formulas they wish to test. The form permits users to specify numerous very precise changes in formulas. The blank Confidential State Aid Data Form includes a section entitled "goals" that lists several factors, including "% increase for NYC." No other school district is listed on the form. The existence of this "goal" is evidence that confirms the Comptroller's assessment that the City's annual increase in State aid is determined during budget negotiations, and not by neutral operation of the State's funding formulas. State budget documents reflect that New York City receives a fixed percentage share of any annual increase in State aid for education. The target has been 38.86%, and the State has hit or come very close to this percentage over the last 13 years. This percentage share is reflected in the final computer runs that SED generates at the conclusion of the budget process. These are the most reliable measures of intended allocations of State aid increases. These runs reflect that an array of manipulations of computerized State aid formulas—and in some years, other types of State aid—were used from year to year to reach this percentage. It is inconceivable that this recurring percentage share could randomly recur year after year. Defendants correctly point out that the actual amounts eventually allocated to school districts have varied somewhat from the amounts set forth in SED's computer runs. The process discussed above determines changes in the formulas. However, some of the data inputs used in the formulas may change before the State school aid is paid out, which in turn may change the percentage increase afforded New York City. The fact remains that the formulas have been altered to effect a particular distribution of State aid and not for any reason keyed to the educational goals supposedly embodied in the formulas. Moreover, the total increase in aid actually received by the City is generally consistent with the amounts predicted in SED's computer runs. [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 90] 90] Plaintiffs' evidence on this issue does not concern impermissible "legislative motive," as defendants argue. The First Department has cautioned this court to protect against any evidence that would violate the Speech and Debate Clause of the State Constitution or the correlative common-law privilege that protects executive branch officials acting in a legislative capacity (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 271 A.D.2d 379 [2000]). The Speech and Debate Clause and the common-law legislative privilege protect governmental officials as they deliberate and weigh policy and legislation. The evidence discussed above is not concerned with legislative deliberations or motives but rather with what the Legislature ultimately does when it modifies State aid formulas to achieve certain annual percentage allocations of increases in school aid. E. Funding Comparisons and Recent BOE Surpluses as Evidence of Adequacy Defendants frequently state in their papers that New York State is the third highest-spending State on education, and that New York City spends more per pupil than most large urban school systems. They argue that these figures alone demonstrate that the State provides enough resources for a sound basic education. Defendants also cite recent increases in State spending as evidence that the State is meeting its constitutional obligation. These facts in isolation are of no probative value. Among other failings, gross spending amounts do not take into account local costs and do not reveal whether the money is spent effectively. Fundamentally, spending comparisons cannot erase the facts discussed above which demonstrate—as measured by the inputs and outputs included in the Court of Appeals' template—that New York City public school students are not receiving a sound basic education. A sound basic education is gauged by the resources afforded students and by their performance, not by the amount of funds provided to schools. The State's recent increases in school funding can only begin to address long-standing problems in New York City's public schools. These increases have been enabled by unprecedented budget surpluses. They have not been coupled with the structural reform necessary to assure that adequate resources are provided to New York City's public schools on a sustained basis. Since there has been no fundamental change in the structure and operation of the State education finance system, there is no guarantee that recent increases are sufficient or will be sustained. [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 91] 91] Defendants also urge the court to compare the City's public schools with Catholic schools in the City. They argue that the City's Catholic schools meet the educational needs of their students and achieve better results than New York City's public schools despite Catholic schools' larger student-toteacher ratio, larger class sizes, lower paid teachers and lower per pupil spending. It is true that the City's Catholic schools consistently outperform public schools on State-wide tests, have a lower drop-out rate, a higher percentage of students graduating high school in four years, and substantially more students attending four-year colleges upon graduation. While the City's Catholic schools do an admirable job, the comparison between the two systems is not apt. The student bodies of the two systems are markedly different. Catholic schools have far fewer students eligible for free lunch, or who are limited English proficient. The City's public school students are approximately 84% minority, compared with approximately 56% of Catholic school students. Catholic schools enroll very few special education children. They also are able to expel from the system any students who are disruptive. Finally, the vast majority of Catholic school teachers are not unionized, and there was credible evidence in the record that many choose lower pay in order to work in a religious environment. Defendants point to recent BOE annual budget surpluses as evidence that the funds provided to BOE are sufficient or that BOE is unable to spend the money given to it because of its hopeless inefficiency. 41 Defendants quote from a letter from plaintiffs' counsel to a BOE official in which he states "How do we defend these [BOE] surpluses * * * and plead poverty?" The evidence demonstrates that these surpluses are the product of sound budgeting practices and not signs of abundance. The practice allows for rational long-term financial planning and enables extra and ongoing funding of high-priority projects. Indeed, defendants defend transition adjustments on similar grounds, arguing that school districts need to provide for ongoing expenses. F. T h e A c t i o n s o f t h e C i t y a n d B O E a s A d d i t i o n a l " C a u s a l L i n k s " The court has already held that the State's method for financing education is a substantial cause of the failure to [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 92] 92] provide New York City public school students with the opportunity for a sound basic education. Under the State Constitution the State is ultimately responsible for the delivery of a sound basic education, and any failure to do so may not be blamed on the actions of its subdivisions BOE or the City.