creates an obstacle to such equality of distribution, it should therefore be treated as suspect; and the non-discrimination requirement of Article 2, para. 2 of the Covenant should address this impact. *** The "violations approach" and the "outcomes approach" have in common that they seek to spare us the burden of having to define the level of efforts States parties to the Covenant must invest in the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights, to comply with the "progressive realization" clause. But this is a burden we must accept. Going beyond a "core obligations" approach requires that we equip ourselves to assess progress in the realization of human rights. This is turn calls for the development of indicators (measuring not only outcomes but also the normative framework adopted by the State and its efforts in moving towards such outcomes92), but also that we agree on clear criteria to assess whether the degree of realization of rights, in any particular State, is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Covenant. We start by proposing a conceptual framework to that effect. IV. The Resources-Spending-Outcomes Conceptual Framework In order to assess whether a State party to the Covenant is discharging its duty to progressively implement Covenant rights to the maximum of its available resources, it is important to consider resource mobilization jointly with spending, and to relate both dimensions to outcomes, i.e. to the effective levels of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Unsatisfactory outcomes (for instance, a large number of homeless persons in the State concerned or an inability for all to have access to adequate healthcare) will only be an infringement of the Covenant if such outcomes reflect not simply an inability of the State to improve the situation, but an unwillingness to do. This implies showing that resource mobilization could have been improved, or that spending priorities could have been defined differently, or both, in order to achieve better outcomes. Resources   mobilized   Outcomes   Spending   choices   Figure 1. The R-S-O conceptual framework for the human rights analysis of budgetary choices by States. In this equation, resource mobilization and spending choices complement each other, to produce the required outcomes. However, it would be incorrect to imply from this that weaknesses concerning one part of the equation may be compensated by sound policies concerning another part of the equation -92 For a discussion of some of the difficulties associated with the use of indicators to measure compliance with human rights, see Maria Green, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement”, Human Rights Quarterly, 23(4) (2001), 1062-1097; Todd Landman, "Measuring Human Rights, Practice and Policy", Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 26 (2004) 906–931; or, more recently, Gauthier de Beco, "Measuring Human Rights: Underlying Approach", E.H.R.L.R., Issue 3(2007), 266-278; Bronwyn Anne Judith Welling, “International Indicators and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 30(4) (2008), 933-958; AnnJanette Rosga and Margaret Satterthwaite, "The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights", Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. 27, Number 2 (2009), 253-315. A synthesis is provided by T. Landman & E. Carvalho, Measuring human rights, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010. 20