law, which in itself would not preclude the apex court from finding a particular interpretation of EU law to be beyond reasonable doubt. LXXI ECJ, Case C-362/14, Schrems, EU:C:2015:650, at 60. LXXII ECJ, Cases C-8/15 to C-10/95, Ledra, ECLI:EU:C:2016:701, at 68. LXXIII In the pending Case C-258/14, Florescu, the Court of Justice will have the opportunity to confirm this approach in a preliminary reference that questions the compatibility with the Charter of a memorandum signed in 2009 between the Commission and Romania within the framework of an EU bailout to a noneurozone Member State (Article 143 TFEU). References  Almeida Ribeiro Gonçalo de and Pereira Coutinho Luís (eds), 2014, O Tribunal Constituticional e a Crise: ensaios críticos, Almedina, Coimbra.  Barnard Catherine, 2013, ‘The Charter in Time of Crisis: A Case Study of Dismissal’, in Nicola Countouris and Mark Freedland (eds), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 250-277.  Canotilho Mariana, Violante Teresa and Lanceiro Rui, 2015, ‘Austerity measures under judicial scrutiny: the Portuguese constitutional case-law’, European Constitutional Law Review, XI(1): 155-183.  Costamagna Francesco, 2012, ‘Saving Europe “Under Strict Conditionality”: a threat for EU social dimension?’, Working Paper-LPF no. 7, available at http://www.centroeinaudi.it.  De Witte Bruno, 2011, ‘The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism’ in SIEPS European Policy Analysis, available at http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDOInstitutions/Documents/SIEPS20116epa.pdf.  Denters Erik, 2006, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn.  European Commission, 2011, ‘The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal. Second Review – Autumn 2011’ in Occasional Papers, 89, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp89_en.pdf.  Fischer-Lescano Andreas, 2014, ‘Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy - The EU institutions and the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding’, Centre of European Law and Politics (ZERP), Bremen, available at https://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/pressrelease/files/legal_opinion_human_rights_in_times_of_austerity_policy_final.pdf.  Joerges Christian, 2014,‘Three Transformations of Europe and the Search for a Way Out of its Crisis’, in Christian Joerges and Carola Glinski (eds), The European Crisis and the Transformation of Transnational Governance: authoritarian managerialism vs democratic governance, Hart, Oxford, Chapter one.  Kilpatrick Claire, 2014, ‘Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge because They Are Not EU Law’, European Constitutional Law Review, X(3): 393-421.  Kilpatrick Claire, 2015, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe´s Bailouts’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, XXXV(2): 325-353.  Koukiadaki Aristea, 2014, ‘Can the Austerity Measures be Challenged in Supranational Courts? The cases of Greece and Portugal’, University of Manchester, Manchester, available at https://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/publication/files/austerity_greeceportugal_en_3.pdf.  López Escudero Manuel, 2015, ‘La Nueva Governanza Económica de la Unión Europea: ¿Una auténtica unión económica en formación?’, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, no. 50: 361-433.  Martín Rodríguez Pablo, 2016, ‘A Missing Piece of European Emergency Law: Legal Certainty and Individuals’ Expectations in the EU Response to the Crisis’, European Constitutional Law Review, XII(2): 265293.  Menendez Agustín José, 2012, ‘La mutación constitutional de la Unión Europea’, Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, no. 96: 41-98.  Miranda Jorge, 2013, ‘Sobre o memorando de entendimento entre Portugal e a “Troika”’, in Eduardo Paz Ferreira (ed), Troika Ano II. Uma avaliação de 66 cidadãos, Edições 70, Lisboa, 315-318. Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -131

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