exploitation bypass the people. Consequently, monitoring bodies often express concerns when natural resources exploitation is linked to encroachment on community lands and livelihoods, mass evictions, pollution and environmental degradation, with resultant rights violations related to health, food, housing and water.195 The CESCR has noted that states violate their duty to protect the rights included in the ICESCR ‘by granting exploration and exploitation permits for natural resources without giving due consideration to the potential adverse impacts of such activities on the individual and communities’ enjoyment of Covenant rights’.196 • Natural resources should be sufficiently/effectively/fairly taxed. A state allowing or directly undertaking natural resources exploitation without ensuring a fair share of its proceeds are taxed and/or allocated towards guaranteeing human rights could be failing to mobilise adequate resources.197 • A state’s population has a right to enjoy a fair share of the financial and social benefits natural resources can provide. The Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty frames these natural resources-related rights in reference to the right to self-determination, which expressly encompasses individuals’ (and not state or government) rights to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.198 Considering that many natural resources are finite and non-renewable, she adds that the right must be specially protected and take future generations’ rights into account. The Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples has underlined that indigenous communities should share in benefits arising from natural resources exploitation on their traditional territories, and that such ‘sharing must be regarded as a means of complying with a right, and not as a charitable award or favour’.199 • In decision-making about natural resources use, states must ensure participation, access to information and high transparency and accountability standards.200 The biggest challenge to translating natural resources wealth into societal benefits is thought to lie in establishing 195 See, eg, Concluding Observations São Tomé and Príncipe CRC/C/STP/CO/2-4 (2013); CESCR Concluding Observations Democratic Republic of Congo (2009) E/C.12/COD/CO/4, para 6; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, Surya P Subedi’ (A human rights analysis of economic and other land concessions in Cambodia) (2012) A/HRC/21/63/Add.1, paras 72, 114–129 and 138–157; CESCR Togo 2013, paras 27– 28; Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, Surya P Subedi’ (2012 and 2014) A/HRC/21/63/Add.1, paras 129–130 and 200 and A/HRC/27/70, para 48; and ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee’ (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/71, para 63. 196 CESCR General Comment No 24, para 18. 197 Eg, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28 and ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on food, Olivier De Schutter’ (Mission to Cameroon) (2013) UN Doc A/ HRC/22/50/Add.2. The Special Rapporteur on the right to food has recommended that Cameroon reconsider the tax policy on concessions of agricultural land and for exploitation of natural resources, to optimise the revenue earned from these resources to improve food security for vulnerable groups. 198 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28, paras 18–19. 199 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people (Special Rapporteur on indigenous people), S James Anaya’ (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/37. 200 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, Surya P Subedi’ (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/63/Add.1, para 9. 56 The Obligation to Mobilise Resources: Bridging Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and Fiscal Policies   December 2017