in fewer resources being available to secure children’s rights in Venezuela269 and led to decreased revenue and resources in Georgia.270 Treaty bodies have requested states intensify their efforts to combat corruption, including by increasing transparency in the public sector and ensuring effective functioning of all anti-corruption measures.271 The CESCR has expressly noted that corruption ‘undermines a State’s ability to mobilise resources for the delivery of services essential for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. It leads to discriminatory access to public services in favour of those able to influence authorities, including by offering bribes or resorting to political pressures.’272 Special procedures have also lent greater attention to the issue of corruption and its impact on securing human rights, in particular during their country missions.273 4.4 Corporate profit shifting Corporate profit shifting refers to techniques that transfer profits to low-tax jurisdictions. While tax evasion practices contravene domestic laws and regulations, this complex corporate tax avoidance scheme is difficult for tax authorities to prove and prosecute.274 Transfer prices are related to cross-border payments from one part of a multinational enterprise, for goods or services provided by another part of the same multinational enterprise. Tax abuse through transfer pricing occurs when a transnational corporation manipulates the prices of related-party transactions to increase profits in low-tax countries and decrease profits in higher-tax countries. The Independent Expert on foreign debt has explained that ‘profit shifting’ gives rise to several damages. First, it leads to a number of tax-revenue losses by both developed and developing countries. Second, corporate tax avoidance perpetuates inequality ‘since the benefits accrue to a small minority while revenue losses will need to be made up by the rest if the population’. Third, it creates an unfair competitive advantage for transnational corporations, as domestic enterprises cannot take advantage of it. Finally, it increases the cost of tax administration as, ‘the more sophisticated tax avoidance schemes become, the more ineffective capacity-building efforts to strengthen tax administration becomes’.275 Some special procedures have noted that increased international cooperation on tax matters is necessary to stop the unnecessary loss of resources276 (see section 2.3 above). 269 CRC, Concluding Observations Venezuela (2014) CRC/C/VEN/CO/3-5. Under the heading ‘allocation of resources’, it directed similar recommendations to Cambodia, CRC, Concluding Observations Cambodia (2011) CRC/C/KHM/ CO/2-3, para 16. 270 CESCR, Concluding Observations Georgia (2002) E/C.12/1/Add.83, para 11. 271 Concluding Observations Uganda E/C.12/UGA/CO/1 and Burkina Faso CRC/C/BFA/CO/3-4. 272 CESCR General Comment No 24, para 20. 273 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on foreign debt, Cephas Lumina’ (Mission to Vietnam)(2012) A/HRC/20/23/ Add.3; ‘Report of the Independent Expert on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (Mission to Zambia) A/HRC/14/31/Add.1, paras 92–96. 274 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on foreign debt, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky’ (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/61, para 17. 275 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on foreign debt, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky’ (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/60, para 20. 276 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on foreign debt, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky’ (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/60, para 20; ‘Independent Expert on international order, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas’ (2016) UN Doc A/71/286; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28. December 2017   The Obligation to Mobilise Resources: Bridging Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and Fiscal Policies 69