Yet, as we have seen in the present section, in recent years, increasing attention has been paid to other resource mobilisation sources, in particular, taxation. This is in line with the 2030 Agenda which, in stark contrast with the Millennium Development Goals – which focused on aid as a principal development-financing source – includes SDG 17 (‘means of implementation’), putting ‘domestic resource mobilisation’ or national fiscal policies at the centre of the development agenda.254 Special procedures and treaty bodies have not yet explored in any significant manner some critical options that are available to states to mobilise domestic resources for human rights realisation. For example, human rights monitoring bodies do not generally address monetary policies and the way in which decisions adopted by central banks contribute or hinder the availability of resources for the realisation of human rights (eg, using the excess of foreign exchange reserves). The lack of attention to monetary policies and central banks contrasts with the increasing public recognition that these policies affect the realisation of human rights, in particular, economic and social rights.255 Human rights monitoring bodies should develop legal standards to better address all alternatives for resource mobilisation. The lack of attention to these issues also contrasts with the work that even some small NGOs are doing, such as regularly including in their analyses and reports a broader set of alternatives for resource mobilisation when assessing states’ compliance with human rights obligations.256 To address these prevailing gaps, human rights monitoring bodies should consolidate, strengthen and further develop legal standards and methodologies to assess whether or not states have utilised all alternatives for resource mobilisation. This must include an analysis of adherence to the rule of law at the national level, without which resources can be diverted through fraud or corruption. Today, when reviewing states’ reports (treaty bodies) or in-country missions (special procedures), human rights monitoring bodies rarely ask states to demonstrate whether they have done all they could to mobilise sufficient resources. It would also be advisable, for example, for special procedures and treaty bodies to regularly request information from states on how they arrive at specific policy decisions, whether or not they have weighed certain economic policy choices’ costs and benefits, and if policy trade-offs were explicitly addressed. This will foster transparency regarding decisions made as well as enable the designing of complementary policy measures that ensure those whom the economic policy may adversely affect are protected. 254 SDG target 17.1: ‘Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection.’ 255 See, eg, James Heintz ‘Central Banks: Do They Have Human Rights Obligations?’ in A Bottom-Up Approach To Righting Financial Regulation, Issue No 2, Center of Concern, January 2012, available at www.coc.org/rbw/central-banks-do-theyhave-human-rights-obligations-january-2012 accessed 20 October 2017. See also, Diane Elson, Radhika Balakrishna and James Heintz ‘Public Finance, Maximum Available Resources and Human Rights’ in Aoife Nolan, Rory O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds) Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic (Hart Publishing 2014). 256 See, eg, the work of the Center for Economic and Social Rights (www.cesr.org accessed 20 October 2017) and the Center of Concern (www.coc.org accessed 20 October 2017), as well as other members of the Righting Finance Initiative. December 2017   The Obligation to Mobilise Resources: Bridging Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and Fiscal Policies 65