502us2$26I 01-22-99 08:32:58 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 502 U. S. 367 (1992) 407 Stevens, J., dissenting tinued growth in inmate population to be within petitioners’ contemplation. Other important concerns counsel against modification of this consent decree. Petitioners’ history of noncompliance after the 1973 injunction provides an added reason for insisting that they honor their most recent commitments. Petitioners’ current claims of fiscal limitation are hardly new. These pleas reflect a continuation of petitioners’ previous reluctance to budget funds adequate to avoid the initial constitutional violation or to avoid prolonged noncompliance with the terms of the original decree. The continued claims of financial constraint should not provide support for petitioners’ modification requests.7 The strong public interest in protecting the finality of court decrees always counsels against modifications. Cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 308–310 (1989) (plurality opinion); Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 682–683 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). In the context of a consent decree, this interest is reinforced by the policy favoring the settlement of protracted litigation. To the extent that litigants are allowed to avoid their solemn commitments, the motivation for particular settlements will be compromised, and the reliability of the entire process will suffer. 7 The Court refers to the need to “keep the public interest in mind” when deciding whether to modify a decree. Ante, at 392. It is certainly true that when exercising their equitable powers, courts should properly consider the interests of the “public.” See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955). It must be noted, however, that a remedial decree may well contain provisions that are unpopular; a requirement of additional expenditures to improve jail conditions might be an example of such an unpopular order. Mere unpopularity does not constitute a sufficient reason for modification. As the Court explained in Brown: “Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest . . . . But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.” Ibid.