any event, the State points us to no evidence on how much of any savings on special education would be invested in more productive inputs in City schools. We need not speculate further on the possible saving from special education placement, however, for the State's argument on Board of Education mismanagement fails for a more basic reason. As the trial court and Appellate Division recognized (187 Misc 2d at 81-82, 295 AD2d at 18-19), both the Board of Education and the City are "creatures or agents of the State," which delegated whatever authority over education they wield ( City of New York v State of New York, , 86 NY2d 286 (/nyctap-cgi/nyctap.cgi? 86+286), 289-290 [1995]). Thus, the State remains responsible when the failures of its agents sabotage the measures by which it secures for its citizens their constitutionally-mandated rights. As our ensuing discussion of remedy shows, various reforms unrelated to financing -- some already in the works -- may be part of the package of legislative and administrative measures necessary to ensure a sound basic education to New York City schoolchildren. The requirement stated in CFE, however, was for plaintiffs to "establish a causal link between the present funding system and any proven failure" (86 2 at 318), not to eliminate any possibility that other causes contribute to that failure. Moreover, in every instance where the State has relied on purported political or managerial failings of the City or the Board of Education, closer inspection of the details casts doubt on whether the City could eliminate the failing without the State's help or would have developed the failing without the State's involvement. The issue of special education is illustrative. The trial court held that "the primary causes of New York City's overreferral and overplacement in restrictive settings are a lack of support services in general education and State aid incentives that tended until recently to encourage restrictive placements" (187 Misc 2d at 95). This conclusion is supported by the record and was not disturbed by the Appellate Division. Thus, the State cannot blame overreferral on the institutional culture of the Board of Education and City schools without acknowledging that this culture has evolved to its present condition partly in response to the funding system. At the very least, under CFE, this problem does not constitute a cause sufficiently independent from the State's funding system to overcome plaintiffs' case. Similar reasoning disposes of the State's argument that the Board of Education's inefficient management of personnel is the supervening cause that, rather than the funding system, accounts for deficiencies in the teaching input. The State points to