contrast, nineteen state constitutions mandate a system of public schools meeting an articulated standard of quality such as "thorough and efficient"; eight state constitutions contain a stronger and more specific educational mandate and purposive preambles; and seven state constitutions impose the greatest obligation on the state legislature by providing that education is "fundamental," "primary" or "paramount" ( see id.; see also William E. Thro, School Finance Reform: A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J L & Politics 525 [Summer 1998]). 31 The parties identified and deposed 30 expert witnesses prior to the trial, which featured 72 witnesses and consumed 111 court days over a seven-month period. 32 In assessing the role of expert testimony at the trial in this case, one commentator has remarked that "[i]n many cases, the academic literature is divided on an issue, so the Court took one side" (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, The Economics of Education on Judgment Day, J of Educ Fin, 28 [Fall 2002]at 183206.) Of course, trial courts do this all the time, but usually not when determining what a constitutional standard means or whether it has been violated. 33 These risks were recognized at the time by Judge Levine, who concurred in CFE I, and by Judge Simons, who dissented. Judge Levine carefully tracked the trial and intermediate appellate progress of Levittown. He noted that both lower courts had found violations of the Education Article by applying constitutional standards remarkably similar to the template announced by the majority in CFE I, yet in Levittown we held as a matter of law that plaintiffs and intervenors had not established a constitutional violation. Judge Levine worried that the majority's interpretation of the Education Article might be read to reject Levittown so as to “invite[] and inevitably * * * entail the subjective, unverifiable educational policymaking by Judges, unreviewable on any principled basis” ( CFE I, 86 NY2d at 332). Judge Simons harbored no doubt that the majority had strayed from Levittown, observing that "[o]f course, the majority may interpret the State Constitution, or our Levittown decision, as mandating a level of student performance and authorizing judicial determination of the curriculum and facilities and State funding necessary to achieve that level if it chooses, but I believe it unwise to do so * * * " ( id. at 341). 34 In Paynter v State of New York (decided today), we observe that "[t]he causes of academic failure may be manifold, including such factors as the lack of family supports and health care. But if