2008] The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights 159 may not warrant a “progressi ve realisation” inquiry). 259 And, as Sandra Liebenberg has pointed out, the minimu m core may also be important for its potential to reverse the onus of proo f in socioeconomic cl aims about rights infringement, because once claimants have proved that their minimum core is not protected, it is for the state, rather than the applicant, to prove that it has taken “reasonable legisl ative and other measures, within its available resources, to achi eve the progressive realization of th[e] right” 260 or to s how that any limitation “is re asonable and justifiable.” 261 In this sense, the minimum core may be instrumental in ensuring a “practical justiciability” of economic and social rights, turning a “ paper right” of access to court into a practical reality. 262 Domestic justiciability makes this reversal of proof considerably more meaningful than its present (plausible, and yet contested263) operation in internationa l law, given the current supervisory procedures and lack of a compla ints jurisdiction.264 In international law, the burden of proof may also be discharged by demonstrating attempts to secure international assistance, which would seem to be unavailable at the domestic level.265 This possibility is, of course, controversial. Many detractors suggest that the minimum core cannot resolve the justiciability challenges posed by economic and social righ ts, but instead will only amplify them. Because the minimum core concept suggests a substantively defined minimum content for economic and social righ ts, many fear that it w ill drastically alter the separation of powers between co urts, legislatures, and government. 266 This objection rests in the long-articulated con cern that if judges are allowed to adjudicate on the meaning and content of economic and social rights, they will assume greater power over setti ng socioeconomic policy, which they are neither competent enough to decide no r accountable enough to administer. 267 259. Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) at 91 (S. Afr.); Liebenberg, Needs, Rights and Transformations, supra note 106, at 25-29. 260. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 26(2), 27(2); see also Liebenberg, Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights, supra note 121, at 22-26. 261. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 36; see also Liebenberg, Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights , supra note 121, at 26-29 (emphasizing a heightened proportionality analysis). 262. Liebenberg, Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights , supra note 121, at 21 nn.100-01 (referring to the arguments of the amicus curiae in TAC). 263. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 5, at 142-44 (suggesting that the Committee did not intend to create a “presumption of guilt” by adopti ng the language of prim a facie violation, but that this is its inevitable effect). 264. For a discussion of work around the complaints procedure, see supra note 175. 265. E.g., General Comment No. 12 , supra note 33, ¶ 17; see also Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, supra note 7, at 27 (suggesting that the burden raised by the minimum core may require the state to prove that it has unsuccessfully sought international support to ensure the realization of the right); see also Statement: Poverty and the Covenant, supra note 5, ¶ 16 (affirming this possibility). One can see structural parallels with the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, launched by the W orld Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1996, and the conditional relief of debt. 266. E.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001). 267. See Frank I. Michelm an, The Constitution, Social Right s, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13 (2003) (labeling this the “ins titutional” concern and discussing possible solutions); see also Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 S TAN. L. REV. 877, 900 (1976) (conceding, after ex amining a rich basis for justification, that “it may be that institutional considerati ons governing the relations between the judiciary and the legislative branch will forever preclude” judicial enforcement of economic and social rights).