166 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33: 113 measures taken for the Human Development Index of the Human 302 other indicators, such as what Development Reports (and their extension), is needed to maximize human capabilities, are relevant. Many commentators suggest that this latter inquiry may be helped by a clearer definition of the mi nimum core of each right. 303 As early as 1990, the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social and C ultural Rights call ed for “indicators [to] . . . as sist in t he development of the ‘core contents.’” 304 A special meeting of experts in 1993 conc luded that indicators relied first on a clarified content of the rights and obligations. 305 Yet might these observers be mistaken? While there is, of course, an important relation ship between the underlying norms that guide the formulation of in dicators and their adherence to rights, what is neede d to guide this assess ment may be a more open formulation of rights, rather than the fixed and narrow parameters of the minimum core. A brief comment about how indicators work in practice suggests how this might be so. The use of i ndicators and benchmar ks is complex. By presenting a veneer of objectivity and by allowing measures to become the ends rather than the means of rights fulfillm ent, indicators, and benchmarks—or, at least, their fixed or uncritical usage—can flout the substantive promise of human 306 rights. They are most effective at confro nting this possibility when they are set within a participatory process and when they articulate clear connections with rights expressed as “dy namic and constantly changing” 307 standards rather than absolute concepts. This approach demands “an open accounting of where judgment lies, why it has been located there, and upon what evidence it ness—and revisability—in the is based.” 308 It is furthered by open interpretation of rights. Of course, completely open-ended norms perp etuate the image of economic and social rights as vague and imprecise. Nonetheless, once it is acknowledged that all right s are open to contestation, such a criticism should Obligation to Devote “Maximum Available Res ources” to Realizing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693 (1994). 302. See Mahbub ul Haq, The Birth of the Human De velopment Index, in READINGS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, MEASURES AND POLICIES FOR A DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM 103 (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kum ar eds., 2003) [hereinafter R EADINGS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT] and other articles in the collection. 303. E.g., Yamin, supra note 301, at 300 (contrasting the goa l of human capabilities with that of particular bundles of commodities). 304. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/19 (July 6, 1990) ( prepared by Danilo Türk) (“[I]ndicators can . . . ass ist in the developm ent of the ‘core cont ents’ of som e of the less developed rights in this domain, and can provide a basis from which a ‘minimum threshold approach’ can be developed.”). 305. See World Conference on Human Rights, Report on Other Meetings and Activities , ¶ 153, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/73, (Apr. 20, 1993) (“[T]he se minar concluded that the first priority was to identify and clarify the content of the various right s and obligations. Only then would it be possible to identify the most appropriate way to assess progre ssive achievement, which may or may not involve the use of statistical indicators.”). 306. Annjanette Rosga & Margaret Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicato rs: Trying to Measure Human Rights 21, 24-25, 27 (Mar. 17, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 307. RAMON C. CASIPLE, EMERGING FRAMEWORK AND APPROACHES IN DETERMINING ESC RIGHTS’ STANDARDS AND INDICATORS: A PHILIPPINE GRASSROOTS EXPERIENCE (2000), http://www.portal-stat.admin.ch/iaos2000/casiple_final_paper.doc; see also Rosga & Satte rthwaite, supra note 306, at 27. 308. Rosga & Sattherthwaite, supra note 306, at 30.