170 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33: 113 and social rights (mai nly those r atified after 1945),328 also contain similarly worded limitations clauses, which allow for proportionality reasoning. C. Signaling Extraterritoriality: The Globalist Challenge Extraterritoriality is implied by the Committee’s assertion that the minimum core may give rise to “nati onal responsibilities fo r all States and international responsibilities for developed States, as well as others that are ‘in a position to assist.’”329 This statement catapults the operation of the minimum core outside of the supervision of national systems of socioeconomic organization and into the super vision of states’ individual (and collective) Yet the minimum core des ignation activities in the international arena. obscures the harder questions of causa lity and liability that operate in this area. Rather than simply attesting to a minimum core, research in this area is more productively addres sed to questions of institutional responsibility, cooperation, or interdependence. 330 The minimum core cannot do this work itself—the Consensus Approach come s closest to attempting this, but flounders on the need for norms outside of consensus.331 The Committee has so far pursued several credible analyses of extraterritoriality. For example, in its Genera l Comment on Economic Sanctions in 1997, the Committee pos itioned the minimum core as the litmus test for the extraterritorial violations arising from states’ collective security decisions.332 It drew parallels between civil and political rights, and economic and social rights, asserting t hat “[j]ust as the international community insists that any targeted State must respect the civil and political rights of its citizens, so too must that State and the interna tional community itself do everything possible to pr otect at le ast the core content of the economic, social and cultural rights of the affected peoples of that [targeted] State.” 333 The Committee was thereby dr awing the causal link be tween the policies of economic sanctions purs ued collectively by states and the materi al deprivations experienced by citizens of other states. While here is not t he place to embark on the analysis of th is connection, and the challenges of implementation that it raises, 334 it is nevertheless an example of the minimum core serving as a pr oxy for negative liability, which could probably arise independently of the minimum core.335 328. See supra note 53. 329. Statement: Poverty and the Covenant, supra note 5, ¶ 16. 330. See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 52. 331. See supra Part III. 332. General Comment No. 8, supra note 36, ¶ 7. 333. Id. 334. Narula, supra note 238, at 786 (noting that, despite th e scandal surrounding the U.N. Oilfor-Food program, which operated in Iraq between 1996 and 2003 and which was marked by corruption, the existence of the program itself supports th e exceptions for food im portation during econom ic sanctions); see also Matthew Craven, The Violence of Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights , in E CONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION, supra note 29, at 71, 75 (noting the difficu lties in assigning le gal responsibility for deprivation when the sanctioning state exercised no formal jurisdiction or control over the population concerned). 335. See also Craven, The Violence of Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in E CONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION, supra note 29, at 77; Legal Consequences of the Cons truction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory