A/69/299 on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2), which sought to confer non-voluntary direct obligations on transnational corporations and business enterprises. The Commission on Human Rights did not adopt the norms, owing in part to strong opposition from States and business entities. In 2005, the Commission, in resolution 2005/69, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 40. The Special Representative submitted, in his final report in 2011, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework ( A/HRC/17/31, annex). The first pillar, protect, reflects the existence in international human rights law of a binding obligation on States to protect individuals from actions of third parties. The pillar requires States to take measures such as instituting laws to hold transnatio nal corporations accountable for their transgressions (principle 1). It could be argued, however, that the State obligation to protect, which is already an important obligation of States under international human rights law, has been ineffective against transnational corporations. 41. The second pillar reflects the obligation of transnational corporations to respect human rights (principle 11). Pursuant to the responsibility to respect, transnational corporations have a responsibility to conduct due dilige nce to identify and address adverse human rights impacts caused by their activities; such due diligence should involve the participation of affected communities (principle 18, commentary). However, because the framework and Guiding Principles reflect existing international law standards and reflect the responsibility to respect only as based on “a global standard of expected conduct” for corporations rather than specific obligations enshrined in binding treaty provisions (principle 11, commentary), it has been argued that there is no legally binding obligation requiring transnational corporations to conduct this due diligence. 36 The rationale appears to be that non-binding responsibilities make good market sense, which itself should provide incentives for transnational corporations to comply with their pledges. For example, the Guiding Principles mention that compliance with responsibilities may be ensured where a transnational corporation institutes policies and procedures that set financial and other performance incentives for personnel. 37 However, providing incentives for compliance makes respect for rights a means to attain an end (the promised incentive), but does not foster respect for rights in and of themselves. 42. The third pillar of the framework requires States to ensure individuals’ access to an effective remedy through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means when abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction (principle 25). An aspect of access to remedy is that corporations should establish or participate in effective, operational-level grievance mechanisms (principle 29). Given that access to remedy is an aspect of States’ obligation to protect, however, __________________ 36 37 14-59014 See Olga Martin-Ortega, “Human rights due diligence for corporations: from voluntary standards to hard law at last?”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 32, No. 1 (March 2014), pp. 55-57. Ibid., p. 16. 13/22