Chapter 4 | Page 183 As discussed above, existing levels of taxation in many developing countries are lower than the optimal tax rates identified by economic simulations.200 Reasons include the regressive taxation system, excessive tax incentives, weak tax authorities, the practice of tax evasion and tax avoidance, and the size of the informal sector.201 Therefore, any examination of taxation policy should address these issues with regard to the appropriate level of taxation, distribution of the tax burden among taxpayers, potential effects of taxation on the overall economy, and the questions of sustainability. A robust system of taxation also provides incentives for government to be more productive in the overall economy, leading to better human rights outcomes, through what economists call the endogenous feedback loop from taxation to development.202 By broadening the tax base, rationalising tax rates, and improving tax administration,203 the government increases its stakes in the economy, which in turn creates strong complementarities between taxation, infrastructure development and human rights. Therefore, addressing these areas of tax administration can enhance resource capacity and have a direct effect on the level of realisation of ESC rights. As explained in this chapter, the imbalance of tax policy can have adverse consequences for the ability of government to address important human rights priorities in the short term as well as the overall conditions for human rights in the future. While economic policy is driven by the desire to create wealth and improve economic conditions, these are not far removed from the normative values of human rights. Given the close interaction and complementarity between economic variables and human rights objectives, it is crucial for governments to employ economic policy tools to achieve human rights targets. The normative framework of the human rights regime (particularly that of ESC 200 Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics (Princeton Univrsity Press, Princeton, 2008), 78. 201 Obenland, above n 133. 202 Besley and Persson, above n 91, 6. 203 The World Bank, above n 73, 17.