A/70/275 Lending and Borrowing, adopted in 2012, in which it is noted that, Governments “are agents of the State and, as such, when they contract debt obligations, they have a responsibility to protect the interests of their citizens”. 22 Similarly, the Principles state that lenders “should recognize that government officials involved in sovereign lending and borrowing transactions are responsible for protecting public interest (to the State and its citizens for which they are acting as agents).” (see article 1). The United Nations guiding principles on foreign debt and human rights express a similar opinion, that every “Borrower State should conduct a transparent and participatory needs assessment, as part of its annual debt strategy, in order to ascertain whether it has a genuine need to obtain new loans” and that all “lenders should satisfy themselves that a Borrower State has made an informed decision to borrow and that the loan is to be used for a public purpose”. 23 45. Even major private financial actors have, through the lens of risk management, acknowledged the intended social purpose for development finance and the existence of possible limitations in international finance, as seen in part by their adoption of guidelines for socially responsible project finance lending. The June 2013 version of the “Equator Principles”, drafted in conjunction with the International Finance Corporation, includes a recognition that participants’ “role as financiers” provides an opportunity to engage in socially responsible dev elopment, “including fulfilling our responsibility to respect human rights.” 24 In short, there has been more a vocal recognition of the obligations that international financial institutions and non-State actors owe to individuals affected by their operations, even when dealing with Governments acting as economic (rather than explicitly political or diplomatic) actors. C. An absolutist view of pacta sunt servanda has not become customary international law 46. Finally, it is also worth highlighting that an absolutist view of pacta sunt servanda in the sovereign debt field cannot be understood to be a feature of customary international law. Customary international law would be identified through a combination of State practice and a belief in the existence of a legal obligation (opinio juris) to continue payment under all circumstances. 25 To begin with, it is certainly the case that gunboat diplomacy was previously employed by dominant States to enforce sovereign debts on weaker States, which were often reluctant to pay, until the practice of using force to collect controversial debts was outlawed by the Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts (1907). It also true that under the current monetary regime States have defaulted on their sovereign debts when continued repayment becomes untenable. Thus, the State practice of default and non-payment __________________ 22 23 24 25 15-12541 UNCTAD, Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (January 2012), article 8. See Esposito, Carlos, Li, Yuefen and Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo (eds.), Sovereign Financing and International Law: The UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, Oxford University Press, 2013. A/HRC/20/23 and Corr.1, annex, paras. 36 and 38. The Equator Principles, June 2013 (www.equator-principles.com). See Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo, Li, Yuefen and Sudreau, Marie, “Emerging Customary International Law in Sovereign Debt Governance?”, Capital Markets Law Journal, 2013, vol. 9, No. 1. 13/18