BOSPHORUS HAVA YOLLARI TURİZM VE TİCARET ANONİM ŞİRKETİ v. IRELAND JUDGMENT 31 110. Moreover, the Government considered that Ireland had acted out of obligation and that the European Community and the United Nations provided human rights protection equivalent to that of the Convention. As to the international obligations of the Irish State, the Government argued that it had complied with mandatory obligations derived from UNSC Resolution 820 (1993) and Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93. As a matter of Community law, a regulation left no room for the independent exercise of discretion by the State. The direct effectiveness of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 meant that Statutory Instrument no. 144 of 1993 had no bearing on the State's legal obligation to impound. The ECJ later conclusively confirmed the applicability of Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 and, thereby, the lawful basis for the impoundment. Even if the jurisdiction of the ECJ in a reference case could be considered limited, it had authoritatively resolved the present domestic action. For the State to have done anything other than apply the ECJ ruling, even with a view to its Convention compliance, would have been contrary to its obligation of “loyal cooperation” (Article 5, now Article 10, of the EC Treaty – see paragraph 82 above) and undermined the special judicial cooperation between the national court and the ECJ envisaged by Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty (see paragraphs 96-99 above). As to the applicant company's suggestion that the Supreme Court should have awarded compensation while applying the ECJ ruling, the Government considered that it was implicit in the opinion of the Advocate General in the ruling of the ECJ and in the second sentence of Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 that that regulation did not envisage the payment of compensation. If the scheme envisaged was one of detention without compensation, it would be contrary to the principle of uniform application and supremacy of Community law for member States nevertheless to consider making an award. Finally, the Government found unconvincing the applicant company's suggestion that the Supreme Court had exercised discretion in not taking account of the intervening relaxation of the sanctions regime. If the initial impoundment was lawful (under Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 as confirmed by the ECJ), by definition, the partial relaxation of the sanctions regime in October 1994 did not apply to the applicant company's aircraft as it had already been lawfully impounded. The terms of Regulation (EC) no. 2472/94 were as mandatory and clear as those of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93. It was, indeed, for this reason that a second reference to the ECJ raising Regulation (EC) no. 2472/94 would have been possible but pointless. 111. As to the equivalence of the European Community human rights protection, the Government pointed to, inter alia, Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, the judicial remedies offered by the ECJ and the national courts, the reliance on Convention provisions and jurisprudence by the ECJ