BOSPHORUS HAVA YOLLARI TURİZM VE TİCARET ANONİM ŞİRKETİ v. IRELAND JUDGMENT 43 body appointed by the United Nations to interpret the UNSC resolution implemented by the regulation in question. 147. The Court would also agree with the Government and the European Commission that the Supreme Court had no real discretion to exercise, either before or after its preliminary reference to the ECJ, for the reasons set out below. In the first place, there being no domestic judicial remedy against its decisions, the Supreme Court had to make the preliminary reference it did having regard to the terms of Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty and the judgment of the ECJ in CILFIT (see paragraph 98 above): the answer to the interpretative question put to the ECJ was not obvious (the conclusions of the Sanctions Committee and the Minister for Transport conflicted with those of the High Court); the question was of central importance to the case (see the High Court's description of the essential question in the case and its consequential judgment from which the Minister appealed to the Supreme Court – paragraphs 35-36 above); and there was no previous ruling by the ECJ on the point. This finding is not affected by the observation in the Court's decision in Moosbrugger (cited and relied on by the applicant company – see paragraph 116 above) that an individual does not per se have a right to a referral. Secondly, the ECJ ruling was binding on the Supreme Court (see paragraph 99 above). Thirdly, the ruling of the ECJ effectively determined the domestic proceedings in the present case. Given the Supreme Court's question and the answer of the ECJ, the only conclusion open to the former was that Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 applied to the applicant company's aircraft. It is moreover erroneous to suggest, as the applicant company did, that the Supreme Court could have made certain orders additional to the ECJ ruling (including a second “clarifying” reference to the ECJ) as regards impoundment expenses, compensation and the intervening relaxation of the sanctions regime. The applicant company's motion and affidavit of October 1996 filed with the Supreme Court did not develop these matters in any detail or request that court to make such supplemental orders. In any event, the applicant company was not required to discharge the impoundment expenses. The fact that Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 did not admit of an award of compensation was implicit in the findings of the Advocate General and the ECJ (each considered the application of the regulation to be justified despite the hardship it implied) and in the expenses provisions of the second sentence of Article 8 of the regulation. Consequently, the notions of uniform application and supremacy of Community law (see paragraphs 92 and 96 above) prevented the Supreme Court from making such an award. As noted in paragraph 105 above, Regulation (EC) no. 2472/94 relaxing the sanctions regime as implemented in the European Community from October 1994