economic recession in Latvia. Similarly, Paragraph 20 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Community and the Republic of Latvia states: “For Latvia the Memorandum shall become effective after completion of internal procedures required under the Laws of Latvia” (Case materials, vol. 11, p. 66). The Constitutional Court could not agree with the statements concerning receipt of the loan found in the letter of the Minister for Justice to the European Commission, namely, that all the approvals and authorisations required for the receipt of the loan have been obtained and that the Agreement does not violate any provision of national legislation, and that the enactment of the Agreement will not violate the requirements of any Latvian legislative act, and that its lawfulness, validity and enactment will not be impugned in the court or any other institution (see Letter of the Minister for Justice of the Republic of Latvia to the European Commission, Annex 3 to the Loan Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Latvia of January 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/latvija/documents/pievienotie_faili/29.01.09.la.doc, accessed on 1 December 2009). The Constitutional Court maintained that the conceptual decision with respect to the receipt of the international loan and terms and conditions thereof is to be deemed as an important and significant matter of State and public life, and that, in compliance with the procedure established by the Constitution, it had to be decided by the legislator itself. Although the Saeima has adopted the Economic Stabilisation and Growth Revival Programme for Latvia, has carried out decisions concerning changes to the State budget for 2009 and has adopted the State budget for 2010, these decisions cannot replace the rights established by the Constitution and also the duty to decide on all the substantial matters relating to the aforementioned loans, including the matters concerning the possible authorisation for the Cabinet of Ministers. Therefore, the international commitments assumed by the Cabinet of Ministers cannot by themselves serve as an argument for the restriction of the fundamental rights established by Article 109 of the Constitution. 30.2. In order to ascertain whether there were less restricting means at the disposal of the legislator, the Constitutional Court had to determine whether the legislator had considered possible alternatives to the impugned provisions. 51