48 234. It follows from the newer interpretation that states' obligation under Article 2§4 of the Charter consists in measures to compensate for residual risks. By this, the Committee means situations in which workers are exposed to risks that it is not possible or has not yet been possible to eliminate or sufficiently reduce despite the application of the preventive and protective measures referred to in Articles 3 and 11 or in the absence of their application. 235. In this case, it considers that the mining industry is still one of the particularly dangerous industries in which workers’ health and safety risks cannot be eliminated, and that Greek law still classifies mining as an arduous and hazardous occupation. It therefore considers that, in addition to preventive and protective measure, the state was required to provide for compensation in this sector. 236. Article 2§4 mentions two forms of compensation, namely reduced daily working hours and additional paid holidays. In its examination of reports under the revised Charter, the Committee has stated that other means of reducing the length of exposure to risks may be considered acceptable (Conclusions 2003, Bulgaria, Article 2§4 of the revised Charter, pp. 24-27). It states that under no circumstances can financial compensation be considered an appropriate response under Article 2§4. Apart from this particular situation, the Committee will rule on the suitability of other approaches not in the abstract but case by case. For example, in a situation where a measure of this type was contemplated as a general solution, making no distinction according to the type and nature of the risk involved, it ruled that a reduction in the number of years of exposure was not an appropriate measure in all cases (ibid). 237. Greek law does provide for compensation for miners because of the arduous nature of their work, such as early retirement and special bonuses for most DEH mine staff and additional leave for those working shifts. However, such measure must be implemented by collective agreements. 238. The Greek Government argues that it cannot be held responsible for the lack of provisions on this subject in collective agreements. The Committee points out that while states party can choose to leave it to collective agreements to ensure that the Charter is implemented, the “state” – whether a legislative, regulatory or judiciary body – must guarantee the effectiveness of rights (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise against Sweden (No. 12/2002), decision on the merits of 15 March 2003, §27; see also European Roma Rights Center v. Greece, complaint No. 15/2003, decision on the merits of 8 December 2004, §29); 239. In the present case, current Greek legislation does not require collective agreements to provide for compensation pursuing the aim intended by Article 2§4, although employers and employees are of course at liberty to do so themselves. The Committee considers therefore that the collective bargaining procedure does not offer sufficient safeguards to ensure compliance with Article 2§4. Moreover, the Committee also notes that the Government has taken no subsequent steps to enforce the right embodied in Article 2§4.