-15liability such as the presumption of innocence,32 the Court has regarded the restriction as disproportionate unless it goes no further than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question. “minimal impairment” test. This is sometimes called the Similarly, in discrimination cases, where the differentiating inroad is based on certain personal characteristics sometimes referred to as “inherently suspect grounds” such as race, colour, sex or sexual orientation, the Court will subject the impugned measure to “intense scrutiny”, requiring weighty evidence that it goes no further than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question.33 41. However, as the Chief Justice noted in Fok Chun Wah v Hospital Authority,34 “... it would not usually be within the province of the courts to adjudicate on the merits or demerits of government socio-economic policies”. Where the disputed measure involves implementation of the Government’s socio-economic policy choices regarding the allocation of limited public funds without impinging upon fundamental rights or involving possible discrimination on inherently suspect grounds, the Court has held that it has a duty to intervene only where the impugned measure is “manifestly without reasonable justification”.35 That is a test initially applied by the European Court of Human Rights while according a broad margin of appreciation to member States in setting and implementing their socio-economic policies.36 As the Chief Justice points out, the margin of appreciation principle has previously been adapted to 32 As in HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574; and HKSAR v Ng Po On (2008) 11 HKCFAR 91. 33 As in Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 335 at §§19-22; Fok Chun Wa v Hospital Authority (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409 at §§77-78. 34 (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409 at §66. 35 Ibid at §§71 and 76. 36 The Strasbourg and United Kingdom case-law is reviewed in Humphreys v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2012] 1 WLR 1545 at §§16-22.