(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. There is no question, of course, that the Charter applies to provincial legislation; see RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. There are two ways, however, in which it can do so. First, legislation may be found to be unconstitutional on its face because it violates a Charter right and is not saved by s. 1. In such cases, the legislation will be invalid and the Court compelled to declare it of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Secondly, the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the actions of a delegated decisionmaker in applying it. In such cases, the legislation remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter. 21 The s. 32 jurisprudence of this Court has for the most part focused on the first type of Charter violation. There is no doubt, however, that the Charter also applies to action taken under statutory authority. The rationale for this rule flows inexorably from the logical structure of s. 32. As Professor Hogg explains in his Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed. 1992 (loose-leaf)), vol. 1, at pp. 34-8.3 and 34-9: Action taken under statutory authority is valid only if it is within the scope of that authority. Since neither Parliament nor a Legislature can itself pass a law in breach of the Charter, neither body can authorize action which would be in breach of the Charter. Thus, the limitations on statutory authority which are imposed by the Charter will flow down the chain of statutory authority and apply to regulations, by-laws, orders, decisions and all other action (whether legislative, administrative or judicial) which depends for its validity on statutory authority. The sentiment of Lord Atkin in speaking of a constitutional prohibition addressed solely at the legislative branch is also apposite: "The Constitution", he wrote, "is not to be mocked by substituting executive for legislative interference with freedom"; see James v. Cowan, [1932] A.C. 542 (P.C. Australia), at p. 558. 22 The question in the present case, then, is whether the alleged breach of s. 15(1) arises from the impugned legislation itself or from the actions of entities exercising decision-making authority pursuant to that legislation. The proper framework for determining this question was set out by Lamer J. (as he then was) and approved by a majority of this Court in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038. In that case the Court was faced with determining the constitutionality of orders issued by an adjudicator under the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, that were alleged to violate an employer's s. 2(b) right to freedom of _expression. The Code endowed the adjudicator with a broad discretion to remedy the consequences of an unjust dismissal. There being no question that the Charter applied to the adjudicator, the only issue was whether it was the legislation or the order that potentially infringed the Charter. In determining this question, Lamer J. (as he then was) stated that legislation conferring a discretion must be interpreted, in so far as possible, consistently with the Charter. He explained as follows, at p. 1078: