[VOL. 48: 773, 2011] Socioeconomic Rights and Theories ofJustice SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW persecute or suppress others if it wishes."5 So we might ask, If this is an appropriate way of arguing for rights of religious liberty, why would it not also be an appropriate way of arguing for other rights such as socioeconomic rights? One contrast between a theory of justice and a theory of rights is that although the latter is often just presented as a list without addressing issues of conflict and priority, the former aspires to a more unified and systematic account. But in fact, Rawls's theory of justice turns out to have some list-like aspects too. "[I]t is essential," he says, "to observe that the basic liberties are given by a list of such liberties." 59 This might encourage us to think that we could just insert a list of social and economic rights in our theory of justice, as Rawls inserted a list of civil and political rights in his First Principle. In a later discussion, Rawls says: Some may think that to specify the basic liberties by a list is a makeshift which a philosophical conception of justice should do without. We are accustomed to moral doctrines presented in the form of general definitions and comprehensive first principles. Note, however, that if we can find a list of liberties which . . . leads the parties in the original position to agree to these principles rather than to the other principles of justice available to them, then what we may call "the initial aim" ofjustice as fairness is achieved. This aim is to show that the two principles of justice provide a better understanding of the than the first principles claims of freedom and equality in a democratic society 60 associated with the traditional doctrines of utilitarianism. He goes on to say that, for this purpose, the list can be drawn up by considering "which liberties are essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise. . . of moral personality over a complete life," and we bring that together with a survey of "the constitutions of democratic states," particularly those that have worked well, to see which of these liberties are normally protected.6 ' We might try out various lists, moving back and forth between the criteria just mentioned and a sense of what would be accepted in the original position, until we have come up with a "last preferred list." 62 Well, then, we might say that there is no reason why such a methodology should not take us beyond traditional civil and political rights into the realm of socioeconomic rights. Prominent international 58. 59. Id. Id. at 53. 60. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 292 (1996). 61. 62. Id at 292-93. Id. at 293. 793