human rights instruments now include these as do certain wellfunctioning constitutions, such as that of South Africa. Those who believe in such rights defend them by arguing that they indeed represent "essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise. . . of moral personality."6 3 And as we shall see in a moment, there might well be a direct original-position argument to be made in their favor. If all this is true, then the list-ness of socioeconomic rights-the fact that they are not theorized in the way that theories of justice normally theorize things-need not be an obstacle, at least if we accept the general outlines of Rawls's methodology in this regard and buy into his rejection of the criticism-which is more or less a version of the criticism with which I began this Part-that the use of such a list of rights in a theory of justice is a disreputable "makeshift." All that is quite persuasive. On the other hand, there may possibly be reasons specifically for not treating socioeconomic rights in this manner, which do not apply straightforwardly to the civil and political liberties on Rawls's list. Consider, for example, Rawls's reasons for not including the fair value of liberty-the material resources that enable one to use one's liberties to one's advantage-under the heading of the First Principle. Rawls writes: The inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty. I shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty. 64 The point of this distinction is not to heartlessly brush aside questions about poverty and lack of means. Rawls did not believe that a society could pride itself on offering its poorer citizens civil and political rights, in this narrow sense, without paying any attention to their material condition. But it is precisely the task of the "Second Principle" governing social and economic inequalities to pay attention to this matter. The connection between a liberty and the worth of that liberty binds the two principles of justice together by indicating the importance of economic well-being in determining whether the liberties governed by the First Principle are actually worth having. But if the worth of liberty had to be dealt with under the First Principle, there would be precious little for the Second Principle to deal with because almost all of the primary goods affected by the Second Principle have some direct or indirect relevance to the effective use that one can make of the rights governed by the First Principle. 63. 64. 794 Id. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 179.