[VOL. 48: 773, 2011] Socioeconomic Rights and Theories ofJustice SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW resources that are morally theirs or out of ill-gotten resources that are "theirs" only in the shallowest of legal senses. In general, theories of justice do not seem to be designed for the real world. But the socioeconomic rights that people talk about are. They are designed exactly to operate in a real world that does not answer to ideal models of the philosophers. "[T]he right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family" laid down in Article 11(1) of the ICESCR is supposed to apply in real world situations, whether or not those situations are properly governed by the strictures of whatever turns out to be the best theory of justice.8 0 True, accounts of socioeconomic rights are sometimes accused of being utopian. (We considered this above in Part III.) But assuming that what these rights require can be done, the position of their proponents is that it ought to be done without further ado, and certainly without waiting for the rest of an ideal theory of justice to swing cumbersomely into application. On the other hand, the thought that socioeconomic rights ought to have this immediate real-world application does not mean that they can be considered entirely apart from theories of justice. Most theorists of justice defend their emphasis on ideal theory because they think it illuminates and provides the best basis for approaching issues of nonideal theory. Rawls is typical: I examine the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions. ... Thus I consider primarily what I call strict compliance as opposed to partial compliance theory. The latter studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice.. . . Obviously the problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and urgent matters. These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life. The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems. . . . At least, I shall assume that a deeper understanding can be gained in no other way. 8 1 The need for a "systematic grasp" is important. The disordered world in front of us is certainly the product of injustice. But which aspects of the disorder that we see are to be attributed to injustice? If the existing situation is unjust, then something needs to be done about it. But what? And are we sure we can distinguish intuitively and without theoretical 80. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 2, at 50. 81. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 7-8 (citations omitted). But see AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE vii-xii (2009), for a more aggressive insistence on focusing on perceptions of injustice in the first instance. 801