right that is separately articulated, before reasonableness is applied.90 By integrating the analysis of a right’s progressive realization, within the state’s available resources, in the same step as defining the right, there is no standalone content, inflated or otherwise. Thus, this form of review does little to outline the scope of the right, even while it may require proof from government that it has engaged in reasonable priority setting. Partly, this is because of the Court’s insistence that it will not recognize a self-standing “minimum core” of economic and social rights.91 But partly, this is due to the Court’s reluctance to set any baseline entitlement or standard, outside of the legislative or common law context arising in each case.92 This general approach is also compatible with the features of weak-form review applicable to South Africa, as elsewhere.93 Although the distinction is not used in South Africa, this way of defining content is more akin to setting out an institutional guarantee, enclosed in the garb of a justiciable, subjective right. Such an approach has the advantage of keeping the right open to new claims and articulations; nevertheless, it allows the court to obscure its own engagement with the underlying values behind particular rights and the impact of the deprivation on 90 Compare i.e. § 26(1) and 26(2); see further Iles, supra note 59. See supra text accompanying note 58. 92 See, e.g., A.J. Van der Walt’s suggested principle of “subsidiarity”, which requires that “direct application of the Constitution and the application and development of the common law should only come up in the absence of legislation …. [L]egislation either fails constitutional scrutiny or triggers a subsidiarity principle according to which the right must primarily be protected via the legislation and not via direct application of the constitutional provision or the common law: A.J. Van der Walt, Normative Pluralism and Anarchy, 1 CONST. CT. REV. 77, 108 (2008); see also Brian Ray, Evictions, Aspirations and Avoidance, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 173 (2015). 93 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008); STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013). 91 21