Conclusion The operation of proportionality is an asymmetrical one in the so-called “global model” of constitutional rights – it is a test that has not been invoked in the prominent economic and social rights cases usually associated with this model. Partly, this is because the “margin of appreciation” that attends a proportionality inquiry is more likely to be triggered under present conceptions of economic and social rights. Nonetheless, the proportionality principle – that “the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required” – inflects the standard of reasonableness that has been developed for economic and social rights adjudication. This paper suggests that the reasonableness standard, which follows a methodology of contextualized rights-evaluation, rather than the separate rightsidentification and justification-of-limits associated with the proportionality test, can nevertheless be both protective, and constraining, of justiciable rights. By avoiding the “containment” doctrines that can effectively remove all strength from a purportedly stronger intensity of review, the use of a proportionality-inflected reasonableness may yet deliver greater rights protection. 35