LEGAL AUTHORITY The main thrust of appellants' argument is that the local boards of education, being creatures of the state, cannot sue it. Even though the Council is a non-profit corporation it is claimed that because the Council's members are all local boards of education, the Council, whose corporate veil is pierced by some strained logic, is also a servant who cannot challenge the master. We disagree. In creating the local boards of education, the General Assembly endowed them with broad and specific powers to enable them to execute their statutory mission. "Each board of education shall have general control and management of the public schools in its district...." KRS 160.290(1). It is empowered to promote public education and "the education and the general health and welfare of pupils." Id. "... Each board of education shall be a body politic and corporate with perpetual succession. It may sue and be sued; and do all things necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it is created ...." KRS 160.160 (emphasis added). This corporate body politic is specifically granted the power to do "all things necessary " to carry out its duties and responsibilities, including exercising its right to sue and be sued. Nowhere in the statutes can one find a restriction on the right of the local boards to sue. The General Assembly has not stated that it cannot be sued by local boards. The subject matter of this lawsuit is whether the General Assembly has complied with its constitutional duty to provide an "efficient" system of common schools in Kentucky. Who is better qualified, who is more knowledgeable, who is more duty-bound, than the local school boards to raise the question? If the General Assembly is not adequately meeting its responsibility, how can the local boards meet theirs? It is sterile logic that says that the local school boards cannot sue their masters, the General Assembly (or the Commonwealth), especially when one considers the statutory grants of authority cited above. Appellants rely on the case of Board of Education of Louisville v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 6 (1970), to support their argument. In that case, the question presented was whether the General Assembly had the authority to distribute the proceeds of a county-wide occupational tax among the Louisville, Jefferson County and Anchorage Independent school districts, the effect of which would be that some of the funds raised in Louisville would be distributed to the County and to Anchorage Independent districts. The Louisville district argued in that case that it was a municipal corporation and that its funds could not be used elsewhere. This Court rejected this argument and upheld the General Assembly's authority to determine the distribution of Jefferson County's occupational tax proceeds. The Court's decision was based on whether the legislation was "appropriate" under the provisions of Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution. " 'The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.' " Id. at 8 (emphasis added). We said that legislation is only inappropriate if it conflicts with some other constitutional provisions of equal dignity. In declaring the Louisville Board not to be a municipal corporation, the Court stated: "Thus, though a school district possesses some of the attributes of a municipal corporation for some legal purposes ... and though a school district is regarded as a political subdivision for some legal considerations--a school district is, nevertheless, an agency of the state subject to the will of the legislature and existing for one public purpose only--to locally administer the common schools within a particular area subject to the paramount interest of the state." Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). Appellants seize upon this language to posit that local boards are not empowered to sue the state. We do not agree. This language simply reiterates that the local