issue of the constitutionality of the Kentucky system of common schools. If a statute (or in this case, a system established by statutes) is not constitutionally valid, the existence or non-existence of a class of litigants is immaterial. The constitutional issue has been raised by the Council, the individual school districts, and by those individual students properly before this Court. The system is no more nor no less susceptible to constitutional challenge because of the lack of a class action. See, e.g., Bright v. Baesler, 336 F.Supp. 527 (E.D.Ky.1971); Kelley v. City of Ashland, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 312 (1978); Moormen v. Morgan, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 146 (1955); Barker v. Crum, 177 Ky. 637, 198 S.W. 211 (1917). While we concur with appellants' contention, the effect of our decision on this legal point is that it is non-dispositive. VIII. ARE ALL THE TWENTY-TWO INDIVIDUAL STUDENT PLAINTIFFS BEFORE THE COURT? This issue is closely akin to the one previously decided. Twenty-two students were named as individual plaintiffs, suing by and through their parents as next friends. None of the parents testified, and only one of the students testified. At trial, reference was made to four student-plaintiffs by another witness. Appellants argue only the latter five students are properly before this court, and that there is no evidence in the record to show "that either of these five plaintiff-students has individually suffered a violation of his or her constitutional rights." We have previously declared that the Council and the individual districts are properly before this court. We are not cited any legal authority for the proposition that a party has to testify before he or she is properly before the court, and we know of none. Twenty-two students allege that the Kentucky system of common schools is violative of Section 183. The fact that all of the students did not testify is irrelevant. The constitutional issue presented is clearly before this Court. IX. DOES THE COMPLAINT STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE TWO LEGISLATORAPPELLANTS? The remaining appellants in this action are State Senator John A. Rose, who is President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Representative Donald J. Blandford, who is Speaker of the House of Representatives. Appellants argue that the declaratory judgment is a nullity against them. They claim that all 138 members of the Kentucky General Assembly would have to be joined as parties-defendant for the relief granted to be valid. The premises for this argument are as follows: that the essence of the trial court's decision is that the financing of the system of common schools by the General Assembly is inadequate; and it is the entire General Assembly which will be required to raise more money for the system. Additionally, appellants maintain that since the General Assembly is not a corporate body, and since the appellants are not authorized to accept service for the entire membership, the court is not empowered in this action to direct the General Assembly to take any action. Lastly, appellants contend that the trial court's retention of continuing supervision through an "openend" type of jurisdiction will lead to the court improperly attempting to direct the actions of the General Assembly. The trial court did, as claimed, keep a type of open-end jurisdiction or supervision of the matter. As will be seen infra, we believe this to be improper. Regarding appellants' other assertions we believe that the appellants do not correctly interpret the trial court's judgment, and moreover, we believe that the General Assembly, as a legislative body, is properly before this Court.