XI. IS THE PRESENT SYSTEM "EFFICIENT"? We have described, infra, in some detail, the present system of common schools. We have noted the overall inadequacy of our system of education, when compared to national standards and to the standards of our adjacent states. We have recognized the great disparity that exists in educational opportunities throughout the state. We have noted the great disparity and inadequacy, of financial effort throughout the state. In spite of the past and present efforts of the General Assembly, Kentucky's present system of common schools falls short of the mark of the constitutional mandate of "efficient." When one juxtaposes the standards of efficiency as derived from our Constitution, the cases decided thereunder, the persuasive authority from our sister states and the opinion of experts, with the virtually unchallenged evidence in the record, no other decision is possible. XII. DID THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PROVISION OF THE KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION? Appellants assert that the trial court's judgment violates the separation of powers doctrine in that it exceeded the authority of the court in "dictating" to the General Assembly, and it exceeded the authority of the court by creating a type of openended judgment which required legislator-defendants to report their progress to the trial court. Our constitutional provisions which relate to separation of powers between the three separate and independent branches of government were authored by Thomas Jefferson. They are as follows: "Sec. 27. The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of the magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another." "Sec. 28. No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." Section 29 vests the legislative power in the General Assembly, and Section 109 grants the judicial power to the Court of Justice. Because of the specific wording of the Constitution, we have previously noted the strength of the separation of powers doctrine in this state: "Our present Constitution contains explicit provisions which, on one hand, mandate separation among the the three branches of government, and on the other hand, specifically prohibit incursion of one branch of government into the powers and functions of the other. Thus, our constitution has a double-barreled, positive-negative approach...." Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 907, 912 (1984) (emphasis added). Moreover, in Brown, we reiterated that the doctrine of separation of powers must be "strictly construed." Id. Simply stated, we have declared that the power to legislate belongs to the General Assembly, and the power to adjudicate belongs to the judiciary. It is our goal to honor both the letter and spirit of that constitutional mandate. "Our functions are to determine the constitutional validity and to declare the meaning of what the legislative department has done. We have no other concern." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820, 825 (1942). With these principles to guide us, we now address appellants' contentions.