allegations of discriminatory intent, a necessary element of a title VI claim. [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 6] 6] By contrast intent is not an element of plaintiffs' claims under various implementing regulations promulgated by the Federal Department of Education under title VI. These regulations incorporate a disparate impact theory of liability. Accordingly, this court let stand plaintiffs' claims under title VI's implementing regulations (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, supra, 162 Misc 2d, at 499-500). The result reached by this court was left intact by the Court of Appeals (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307 [1995] [referred to herein as the 1995 decision]). While the Court of Appeals affirmed this court's dismissal of certain parties and claims, it disagreed with aspects of this court's analysis of plaintiffs' constitutional claim. The Court of Appeals set forth a "template" to guide this court's determination as to whether defendants are providing New York City public school students with a sound basic education. The Court of Appeals decision is discussed at greater length in section III below. The parties delivered their opening statements on October 12, 1999. Testimony was taken during 111 court days over a seven-month period. The last of 72 witnesses left the stand on May 15, 2000. Over 4,300 documents were admitted into evidence. Extensive posttrial briefs and proposed findings of fact were submitted by the parties, and the court heard closing arguments on July 29, 2000. I I . A B r i e f H i s t o r y o f S c h o o l F u n d i n g L i t i g at i o n School funding litigation in this State, from Levittown (supra) to the instant action, has followed a pattern seen in similar litigation around the Nation. It is common among commentators to divide school funding litigation into three "waves" defined by the dominant legal theory asserted by plaintiffs (see Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp L Rev 1151, 1152, n 9; Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 BC L Rev 597). In fact there is much overlap between the legal theories asserted in these three "waves" (see Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34 Harv CR-CL L Rev 547 [1999]). However, the organization of the relevant cases into waves provides a reasonably accurate means for discussing trends in school funding litigation. As is well known, most States rely in large measure upon local property taxes for education funding. Because of property [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 7] 7] value differences certain localities benefit from high-tax revenues and others suffer from low-tax revenues resulting in uneven funding among school districts. In the first wave of cases, which ran from the late 1960's to the Supreme Court's San Antonio decision (supra) in 1973, plaintiffs argued that these variations in funding amounted to violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. As noted above, this line of attack was foreclosed by the San Antonio decision, in which the Supreme Court declined to find that education was a "fundamental right" under the Federal Constitution or that the plaintiffs in property-poor districts were a protected class. Accordingly, the San Antonio Court held that disparities in school funding would be judged by the "rational basis" test. The Supreme Court had no difficulty finding that it is permissible for States to jointly fund public schools with localities, and that the inequality in funding caused by differences in property wealth among school districts was a by-product of a State's rational decision to give localities a voice in funding and governing their local schools. (San Antonio, supra, 411 US, at 54-55.) The second wave of cases, beginning with the landmark New Jersey case of Robinson v Cahill (62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert denied 414 U.S. 976 [1973]), concerned arguments based on provisions of State Constitutions—usually, but not always, the Equal Protection and Education Clauses of State Constitutions. 3 With the possible exception of Mississippi, all the States have some form of Education Clause in their respective State Constitutions. 4 Plaintiffs in the second wave cases generally argued that the existence of an Education Clause in a State [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 8] 8] Constitution meant that education was a "fundamental right" and that any impingement of that right was subject to "strict scrutiny" under standard equal protection analysis. Levittown (supra) was one of the cases in this second wave, and it was among the majority of cases that found that unequal funding of school districts did not violate State Equal Protection Clauses. Commentators point to three cases decided in 1989 by the highest courts of Montana, Kentucky, and Texas as the beginning of the third wave (see Heise, op. cit., 68 Temp L Rev, at 1162). 5 With some exceptions, third wave cases de-emphasize equal protection analysis and rely instead solely on Education Clauses in State Constitutions (e.g. Abbeville County School Dist. v State, 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 [1999]; McDuffy v Secretary of Executive Off. of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 [1993]; cf. Brigham v State, 166 Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384 [1997] [post-1989 case employing equal protection analysis to strike down school funding scheme]). Although the third wave cases contain greater diversity in legal reasoning than some commentators suggest, these cases are for the most part characterized by an emphasis on adequacy rather than equality. Plaintiffs in the initial two waves of school funding cases tended to emphasize reducing spending disparities and focused on input measures like per-pupil spending. Plaintiffs in third wave cases concentrate instead on the sufficiency of school funding and postulate that there is a constitutional floor of minimally adequate education to which public school students are entitled. Where courts have found that the education afforded public school students falls below this constitutional floor, they have found violations of their State Constitutions (see Abbeville County School Dist. v State, 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 [1999], supra; DeRolph v State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 [1997]; McDuffy v Secretary of [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 9] 9] Executive Off. of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 [1993], supra; Rose v Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 [Ky 1989], supra). In third wave cases courts are called on to give content to Education Clauses that are composed of terse generalities. For example, in Ohio the relevant constitutional provision requires the State Legislature to secure "a thorough and efficient system of common schools" (Ohio Const, art VI, § 2). In South Carolina the relevant constitutional provision provides only that the Legislature "shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State" (SC Const, art XI, § 3).