definition of sound basic education. Admittedly it would be tempting to use the Regents Learning Standards to provide content for the sound basic education standard as the plaintiffs urge. The Standards' specificity would probably help the court take the measure of the education provided New York City public school students, just as they help the Regents do the same. However, this approach would essentially define the ambit of a constitutional right by whatever a State agency says it is. This approach fails to give due deference to the State Constitution and to courts' final authority to "say what the law is." (Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch [5 US] 137, 177; Schieffelin v Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 530-531.) [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 13] 13] Finally, the Court of Appeals left undisturbed Levittown's holding that inequalities in school funding among school districts do not run afoul of the State Constitution. Accordingly, defendants are correct that differences in spending among school districts do not, standing alone, establish that pupils in any of the lower-spending districts receive less than a sound basic education. B . A S o u n d B a s i c E d u c at i o n I n s t i l l s t h e S k i l l s S t u d e n t s N e e d t o B e c o m e P r o d u c t i v e C i t i z e n s While it is important to recognize the limits of the sound basic education standard set forth by the Court of Appeals, this court rejects defendants' contention that the Court of Appeals gave a final definition of sound basic education and that that definition is limited to an education sufficient to allow high school graduates simply to serve as jurors and voters. First, the portion of the Court of Appeals decision quoted above makes clear that the Court did not "definitively specify what the constitutional concept and mandate of a sound basic education entails." (86 NY2d, supra, at 317.) Instead the Court held that "[o]nly after discovery and the development of a factual record can this issue be fully evaluated and resolved." (Id.) Second, the Court of Appeals described its summary of a sound basic education as a "template." A template is a guide for constructing something; it is not the thing itself. Finally, the statutory requirements for voting and for serving on a jury are low. With some minor exceptions, New York State law provides any United States citizen residing in the State who is 18 years of age or older, who is not mentally incompetent, who is not an incarcerated felon or previously incarcerated felon with an unexpired sentence or parole term, and who has not offered to sell his vote or buy that of another, may register to vote (see Election Law §§ 5-100, 5-102, 5-104, 5-106; 49 NY Jur 2d, Elections, §§ 84-123). Similarly, jury service is open to anyone 18 years or older who is a citizen of the United States and resident of the relevant county, who can understand and communicate in the English language, and who has not been convicted of a felony. (Judiciary Law § 510.) Clearly the Court of Appeals' template describes qualities above these low thresholds. The Court of Appeals invoked voting and jury service as synecdoches for the larger concept of productive citizenship (see 86 NY2d, supra, at 316 [sound basic education should [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 14] 14] consist of skills necessary to enable children "to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury"]). Productive citizenship means more than just being qualified to vote or serve as a juror, but to do so capably and knowledgeably. It connotes civic engagement. An engaged, capable voter needs the intellectual tools to evaluate complex issues, such as campaign finance reform, tax policy, and global warming, to name only a few. Ballot propositions in New York City, such as the charter reform proposal that was on the ballot in November 1999, can require a close reading and a familiarity with the structure of local government. Similarly, a capable and productive citizen doesn't simply show up for jury service. Rather she is capable of serving impartially on trials that may require learning unfamiliar facts and concepts and new ways to communicate and reach decisions with her fellow jurors. To be sure, the jury is in some respects an anti-elitist institution where life experience and practical intelligence can be more important than formal education. Nonetheless, jurors may be called on to decide complex matters that require the verbal, reasoning, math, science, and socialization skills that should be imparted in public schools. Jurors today must determine questions of fact concerning DNA evidence, statistical analyses, and convoluted financial fraud, to name only three topics. Defendants argue that passage of the Regents competency tests—which measure the reading, writing and mathematic competency required of eighth to ninth graders—is a sufficient indicator that a student is capable of voting or serving on a jury. 10 Defendants' expert witness, Professor Herbert Walberg, a professor of education and psychology at the University of Illinois, Chicago, testified that most media coverage of elections is pitched at an eighth to ninth grade level of reading comprehension and that therefore any student who passes the Regents competency tests is a productive citizen capable of voting or sitting on a jury. The court was not persuaded by this testimony. This argument implies that the Court of Appeals believed that the State Constitution requires only that graduates of New York City's high schools receive a ninth grade education. Beyond voting and jury service, productive citizenship implies engagement and contribution in the economy as well [187 [187 Misc.2d Misc.2d 15] 15] as in public life. Defendants make much of the fact that the Court of Appeals 1995 decision contains no explicit reference to public schools' duty to give students the foundational skills they need to obtain productive employment or pursue higher education. The court finds that this duty is inherent in the Court of Appeals' admonition that students must be prepared to become productive citizens. Any other interpretation of the 1995 decision would ignore a universally understood purpose of public education. Plaintiffs presented unrebutted expert testimony that preparing students for employment has traditionally been one of the rationales for public education. This point has been recognized by the New York State Education Department and in papers generated by national conferences on public education. The Supreme Court has long recognized that public education is meant to assist students to become "self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." (Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 [1972].) Most State courts that have examined the substantive right to education under the Education Clauses of their Constitutions have recognized both civic participation and preparation for employment as the basic purposes of public education. 11 Finding that a sound basic education encompasses preparation for employment begs the question: what level of employment? The Court of Appeals 1995 opinion does not explicitly address this issue. It is reasonable to assume that the Court of Appeals did not intend that the City's high school graduates need only be prepared for low-level jobs paying the minimum wage. On the other hand, the Court's use of the "minimally adequate" standard indicates that a sound basic education does not require that most of the City's public school graduates be accepted into elite four-year colleges