lead to what might be called the "paradox of the many hands": the larger the number of States involved in a situation that creates obstacles to one State fulfilling its human rights obligations, the more difficult it will be to assert a responsibility of any individual State in that situation. This problem is well known in the area of climate change.168 But it is equally relevant here, where the question is whether any State may be held responsible for a situation -- resulting in the lack of realization of economic and social rights in another State -- for which not the conduct of the former State alone, but that conduct in combination with that of a large number of other States, has contributed to this result.169 Thus, a particular violation of economic, social and cultural rights may be attributed to the conduct of one State -- for instance, a State refusing to provide assistance despite a request to that effect, although that State is "in a position to assist" --, even if other, intervening causes, or the conduct adopted by a number of other States, have also played a role in the violation. But the argument remains theoretical and largely speculative: in practice, quite apart from the lack of enforcement mechanisms to coerce a State into discharging its obligations to provide international assistance and cooperation, alleging the responsibility of one State in a situation for which other States also bear some responsibility (potentially to an even larger degree) may be politically difficult to justify. This is especially the case where the argument made is that the State in question should have done more to support the realization of economic and social rights in another State, for instance by increasing the level of development aid or by facilitating access of that State to international finance. In order for a State to be found responsible for implementing trade policies that destroy local producers' ability to compete on their own domestic markets, the classical tools of attribution and causality should suffice, once the extraterritorial implications of human rights obligations are accepted. It is a different task altogether to seek to engage the responsibility of that State for not providing a certain level of aid to the country which requests it, or for not ensuring that the multilateral trading system works for the benefit of the State which, due to its poor trade balance, finds it difficult to make progress on development indicators. This is because liability for taking certain actions is easier to justify than liability for omissions. But it is also because what is required here from the State is in fact to make up for the failings of an unjust international economic order, for which that State alone cannot be held responsible.170 b) Seeking loans The State which cannot mobilize sufficient resources domestically may then turn to another source of financing to realize economic, social and cultural rights: it may seek a loan from another State or from international lending organisations such as development banks. This is a double-edged sword, however. On the one hand, running public deficits financed by debt may be important to compensate conduct in question, the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result — averting the commission of genocide — which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce" (International Court of Justice, Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment of 26 February 2007), ICJ Reports, para. 430). According to the Court, how much the adoption by the State of a different conduct could have altered the outcome would only be relevant to the question of damages to be awarded (id., para. 461). 168 Christina Voigt, "State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 77 (2008): 1-22. 169 See, most notably, Margot E. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law, cited above note 159. 170 Part of the ambition of the Declaration on the Right to Development (A/RES/41/128 (4 Dec. 1986)) is precisely to overcome what may be seen as a gap in international human rights law. The Declaration provides that "States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development" (Art. 3(3)). Article 4, which stipulates a duty of all States "to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development", with "sustained action [being] required to promote more rapid development of developing countries". The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action further confirms that "States should cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development. The international community should promote an effective international cooperation for the realization of the right to development and the elimination of obstacles to development" (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in relation to the right to development, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 48/121 of 20 December 1993, para. 10). 35