E/CN.4/2006/43 page 13 39. In human development literature, poverty has often been described as a lack of capability, or inability to be free from hunger, malnutrition, ill health, illiteracy or ignorance. Such capability deprivation can lead to conditions of severe lack of “dignity” of the people suffering from such deprivation. Conditions of lacking human dignity are similar to the conditions of lacking human rights but the two are not the same. If human rights were fulfilled, people would not lack dignity. But even if there is no lacking of dignity, one cannot claim that human rights are fulfilled. Even when poverty is reckoned as a lack of capability or absence of many forms of freedom, it cannot be equated with the conditions of lacking in human rights. 40. To be described as conditions of deprivation of human rights, the freedoms that are denied under poverty must be identified as freedoms that are claimed as human rights. Human rights seen as ethical demands or moral entitlement to conditions of a life with dignity can take us some distance in demanding appropriate actions in a society to resolve the problems of poverty. Moral suasion, public scrutiny or civil society mobilization can often put sufficient pressure on the decision-making authorities in a society to take appropriate action. However, in order to appeal to “legal obligations”, poverty must be identified with the absence of deprivation of human rights that have been recognized “legally” through international human rights laws or national domestic legislation. 41. It so happens that the fulfilment of most of the human rights that have been recognized in international human rights laws through the covenant on economic, social and cultural rights and on civil and political rights can be described as the basis of conditions of life without poverty. If these rights, such as the right to food, health, education and an adequate standard of living are fulfilled, it is difficult to imagine that society will still have conditions of poverty. This does not mean that poverty is to be defined as the absence of human rights, as these two concepts are not equivalent. If rights are realized, there may not be any poverty, but even if there is no poverty in a society there could be violation or denial of some human rights. So long as it is true that the realization of recognized human rights would eliminate the conditions of poverty, the society may concentrate on a poverty alleviation programme in terms of fulfilment of human rights. It may not even be necessary to put equal emphasis on the fulfilment of all the rights. If all rights are realized, there will not be any poverty. But it is also possible that if some, but not all rights are realized, the conditions of poverty would be alleviated. 42. An effective poverty alleviation programme in a country can therefore be built upon a policy for the realization of human rights as they have been recognized by the two covenants in the international human rights law. As discussed earlier, the main advantage of this approach is that the notion of obligations can be invoked. If a programme for the realization of human rights, especially one with a direct bearing on the removal of poverty, can be designed in a technically feasible manner and for which both the responsibilities of the duty bearers and the nature of their duties can be specified, it can be implemented in accordance with human rights obligations. States parties would be the primary duty bearers responsible for designing the programmes, inducing other agents to do what is necessary for implementing them by means of incentives and disincentives, laws and procedures and by changing institutions. They are also directly responsible for implementing those programmes. The international community of other States, the donor community, international agencies and multinational corporations should also take the responsibility of doing whatever is necessary to promote the realization of these rights either directly, or more often, in cooperation with State parties.