ICESCR imposes, it would look at whether: (1) there was reasonable justification for the action; (2) alternatives were comprehensively examined; (3) there was genuine participation of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; (4) the measures were directly or indirectly discriminatory; (5) the measures would have a sustained impact on the realisation of rights, an unreasonable impact on acquired rights, or whether an individual or group would be deprived of access to the minimum essential level of economic, social and cultural rights; and (6) whether there was a national-level independent review of the measures.83 The prima facie prohibition of retrogressive measures imposes a strict form of scrutiny and must include a high level of justification.84 As examined in section 5.1 below, this is particularly important in the face of austerity measures (eg, those many states implemented in the wake of the 2007 to 2008 economic and financial crisis). In a public statement, the CESCR has also commented on the non-retrogression principle’s resource dimensions.85 According to the Committee, if a state uses ‘resource constraints’ to justify a retrogressive measure, it will assess the situation considering, inter alia, the country’s development level; the alleged breach’s severity, in particular whether it impinges upon ‘the minimum core content of the Covenant’; the country’s current economic situation and whether it was experiencing a recession; the existence of other serious claims on the State Party’s limited resources; whether the State Party had sought to identify low-cost options; and whether the State Party had sought international cooperation and assistance or rejected offers of resources without sufficient reason. Special procedures’ practices seem to fall in line with the CESCR’s views.86 The obligation to accord a degree of human rights priority to resource allocation ‘[W]ith a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant.’ (ICESCR Article 2(1)) Due to material limitations, prioritisation is always necessary when states allocate resources (eg, they must decide which rights are to be implemented and which expenditures are the most compelling). While states have a sovereign right to make resource allocation decisions, by ratifying or acceding to human rights treaties, they assume limitations on this discretion. 83 See General Comment No 19, on the right to social security (Article 9) (2008), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19, para 42. 84 CESCR, General Comment No 14, para 43; General Comment No 12, para 17; General Comment No 15, para 41; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (Taxation and human rights) (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28. 85 CESCR Statement: An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the ‘maximum of available resources’ under an Optional Protocol UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 (2007). 86 See, eg, CESCR E/C.12/2007/1, para 10; Report of the Independent Expert on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona (2011), UN Doc A/HRC/17/34; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28; Report of the Special Rapporteur on water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque’ (2011) UN Doc A/66/255, para 13; Report of the Special Rapporteur on health, Anand Grover’ (2014) UN Doc A/69/299; and ‘Report of the Independent Expert on foreign debt, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky’ (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/60, para 66. 38 The Obligation to Mobilise Resources: Bridging Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and Fiscal Policies   December 2017