procedures often call on states to undertake human rights impact assessments regarding the trade and investment agreements they negotiate and implement.221 The Special Rapporteur on food has provided states with detailed guidelines on how human rights impact assessments should be prepared to ensure the trade and investment agreements into which they enter are consistent with their obligations as stipulated by international human rights instruments222 (see section below on human rights impact assessments). The CESCR, for example, requested that developed and developing states take economic, social and cultural rights into account in bilateral as well as multilateral trade and investment agreements. This has been emphasised as an extraterritorial obligation, for example, in the case of Switzerland (in reference to the consequences of its foreign trade policies on its partner country’s population)223 and as a domestic obligation, for example, in the case of Tunisia (in reference to impacts on their own vulnerable populations).224 Monitoring bodies’ efforts have acknowledged that, while foreign investment and liberalisation may bring a country economic rewards, such investments are often sought and implemented without detailed consideration of risks or possible adverse effects; the cost of attracting foreign or private investment or entering into trade agreements is frequently left out of the equation. One question to which special procedures and treaty bodies have paid little attention in relation to trade liberalisation is reducing tariff revenues. The cost to a country that arises from reduced tariff revenues – in terms of foregone income and administrative expense related to tax collection – is usually not factored into the equation when calculating the opportunity costs that arise from trade liberalisation agreements. This is an area that special procedures and treaty bodies might want to look at in more detail, to help shape future resource mobilisation policies and trade agreements in ways that are human rights consistent. They should follow human rights guidelines in the Guiding Principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements as developed by the Special Rapporteur on food.225 The Guidelines state, for example, that ‘States should not enter into trade or investment agreements that would require them to adopt measures, such as lowering a tariff or strengthening intellectual property rights, that would result in an infringement of human rights they have agreed to uphold’226 and ‘States should refrain from concluding agreements 221 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations Kenya E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5 (2016), para 14; Concluding Observations Tunisia E/C.12/TUN/CO/3 (2016), para 19; and Concluding Observations Costa Rica E/C.12/CRI/CO/4 (2008). CRC, Concluding Observations Turkey CRC/C/TUR/CO/2-3 (2012), para 23; Concluding Observations Republic of Korea CRC/C/KOR/CO/3-4 (2012), para 27. See also CEDAW, Concluding Observations Columbia CEDAW/C/COL/ CO/6 (2007), para 29; Concluding Observations Philippines CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6 (2006), para 26; and Concluding Observations Guatemala CEDAW/C/GUA/CO/6 (2006), para 32. See also ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on food on his mission to the World Trade Organisation’ (2009) A/HRC/10/5/Add.2, paras 37–38. 222 ‘Addendum to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on food, Olivier De Schutter on Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements’ (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5. 223 See, eg, E/C.12/CHE/CO/2-3 (2010). 224 E/C.12/TUN/CO/3 (2016), para 19. 225 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on food, Olivier De Schutter’ (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5. 226 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on food, Olivier De Schutter’ (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, para 2.2. 60 The Obligation to Mobilise Resources: Bridging Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and Fiscal Policies   December 2017