As discussed below (in section 5.2), the preferential corporate taxation schemes that some countries implement can erode other countries’ ability to mobilise sufficient resources; certain special procedures, as well as the CESCR have been emphatic in considering this practice in violation of human rights obligations.277 In its most recent (2017) General Comment, the CESCR noted that ‘[L]owering the rates of corporate taxes with a sole view to attracting investors encourages a race to the bottom that ultimately undermines the ability of all states to mobilise resources domestically to realise Covenant rights’. The Committee further notes that, ‘as such, this practice is inconsistent with the duties of the State Parties to the Covenant’.278 Other special procedures have also referred to the companies’ obligations to pay taxes more broadly. For example, the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty has noted that business enterprises that knowingly avoid paying tax are purposefully depriving countries of the resources they need to fulfil their human rights obligations and thus are in breach of their own obligations to respect human rights.279 The Working Group on business and human rights notes the responsibility to respect human rights applies to all corporate activities and that business enterprises should not seek to undermine the state’s legitimate exercise of environmental and social oversight.280 4.5 Financial secrecy legislation, tax havens or low-tax jurisdictions Some human rights monitoring bodies have expressed concern about financial secrecy legislation and low corporate income tax jurisdictions because they affect the State Party as well as other states’ ability (see section 5.2 below) to meet their obligations to mobilise maximum available resources for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.281 The Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty has noted that tax havens enable large-scale tax abuse (as well as illicit activities) and deprive countries of revenue they need to fulfil their obligations. In addition, given that most tax havens are located in – or under the jurisdiction of – wealthy countries, the global flow of money to these centres exacerbates global inequalities.282 Secrecy legislation and tax havens include an extraterritorial component that is examined below (see section 5.2 below). 277 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on foreign debt, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky’ (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/60, paras 41–43; ‘Independent Expert on international order, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas’ (2016) UN Doc A/71/286, para 29; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28, paras 74–78. 278 CESCR General Comment No 24, para 37. 279 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28. 280 ‘Report of the Working Group on business and human rights’ (Visit to Ghana) (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/25/Add.5. 281 See, eg, Concluding Observations UK E/C.12/GBR/CO/6 (2016), para 16; Concluding Observations Canada E/C.12/ CAN/CO/6 (2016), para 9. 282 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28, para 61. 70 The Obligation to Mobilise Resources: Bridging Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and Fiscal Policies   December 2017